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I:  Introduction 
 
The 21
st
 century looks poised to be a century of power transition. Hundreds of years of Eurocent-
ric domination of the international system, two world wars that saw the European great powers 
decimate one another and with them the collapse of their colonial empires, followed by the 
bipolar rivalry of the two superpowers. The end of the millennium left only one contender stan-
ding tall above the rest. The United States remains the most powerful country on the planet and it 
will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Nobody is even close to matching the military 
prowess and global power projection capability of the US. But decisive change is taking place in 
international politics. The US is the world’s only superpower, but it is no longer a hyper-power 
leaving all other contenders in the dirt. Others are rising and dusting themselves off, and chief 
amongst those is China. Few doubt that the unparalleled rise of China will significantly change 
the regional political and power dynamics, and China’s impact on the global stage is only set to 
increase. The rise of China as an economic powerhouse has laid the foundation for the rise of 
China as a major military power in Asia and indeed the world. 
When the Chinese civil war ended 60 years ago the country was on its back, exploited, occupied, 
downtrodden, and poor. Not many, perhaps none, have moved so fast and so far from weakness 
to strength as China since then.
1
 At the end of the 19
th
 century Meiji Japan used the slogan “rich 
nation, strong army.”2 China has coined its own version of this is “prosperous country and a 
strong army.”3 Beijing often states, that it has learned from the fate of other rising powers, and 
that it will not repeat the mistakes of the past. China will not follow the path of Imperial 
Germany leading up to World War I, or that of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan before the Se-
cond World War. Neither shall China behave like the world’s two superpowers did during the 
Cold War. China will try to transcend the traditional ways of emerging great powers, and its rise 
will be peaceful and strive for cooperation with all countries. Surely, this is how China wishes to 
be perceived. 
The term “great power” is often fuzzy and used in arbitrary ways both by statesmen and in the 
media. Power means different things to different people, and defining greatness is by no means a 
lesser task. But some countries can be unequivocally labelled a great power no matter how one 
interprets the term. China is surely a member of the club of great powers and it is becoming 
increasingly more powerful based on a number of simple facts: Its territorial extent and strategic 
location, the size of its population, the value and rapid growth of its economy, the immense 
magnitude of its share of global trade, and the strength of its military. Furthermore, China is one 
of but a handful of countries with important national interests around the globe. Whether one 
views a rising China as benign or aggressive, the reality of these facts demands the attention of 
every other country in the world. Perhaps most significantly, China is the only country re-
cognized as a potential challenger and possible threat to American predominance in the future. 
                                                          
1
 Kagan, Robert (2008), The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Atlantic Books, London, p. 25. 
2
 Samuels, Richard J (1994), Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of 
Japan, Cornell University Press, New York. 
3
 Gries, Peter Hays (2005), China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, University of California Press, 
Berkely, p.105 
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Specifically, China is seen by many of its neighbours and countries in its region to have the 
wherewithal to one day supplant the United States as the most powerful country in the world.
4 
In 
a realist perspective, power is the currency of international politics. Population size and econo-
mic power are the main proponents that countries translate into military power. China’s rise in 
recent decades has taken place on an unprecedented scale and at a breathtaking pace. China’s 
ascent towards great power status and potential rival to U.S. predominance has a military 
component that demands attention. In particular, the modernisation of the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) has been a focal point in strategic and security circles.  
By referring to China’s growing military might or to the country’s soaring defence budget, one is 
merely pointing out an obvious fact, albeit an important one. Furthermore military power is an 
imprecise term in the sense that different kinds of military capabilities enable different kinds of 
military strategies and specific strategies demand specific capabilities. Particular strategies and 
distinct capabilities in turn direct the specific force postures. In short, we need to understand 
what the Chinese naval forces can and cannot do in order to explain and understand why and 
how the inevitable rise of China is going to unfold. We need to look at capabilities.  
 
Problem Statement 
 
Is China a Revisionist State? - Understanding and Explaining China’s Naval Modernization and 
Maritime Strategy 
This master thesis will attempt to explain the change in Chinese naval capabilities based on 
structural realism. Theoretically informed propositions based on offensive and defensive realism 
regarding Chinese strategic behaviour will lead to predictions on Chinese naval capability deve-
lopment and force posture. This will be tested against empirical data on the evolution of Chinese 
naval capabilities and trends in the modernization of the Chinese navy and maritime strategy. 
 
II:  Methodology 
General methodological approach in a realist theoretical framework 
 
Structural realism constitutes the theoretical framework of this thesis. Different positions and key 
scholars within this theoretical tradition will be introduced in the following chapter. Initially, we 
shall examine how the fundamentals of  realism as a school of thought regards the basics of 
human political existence and the resulting methodological implications. General assumptions 
about how the world works guide the ontological eye of realism and hence what can and should 
be studied in order to obtain scientific explanations. Realists of all strands would likely endorse 
the following three very basic assumptions about human political life. 
 
                                                          
4
 Nathan, Andrew J & Scobell, Andrew: How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears, Foreign Affairs Vol. 91 
Issue 5, Sept./Oct. 2012 
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Groupism means that the realist view on human beings is that they by and large face one another 
as members of a group. To ensure anything more than survival above subsistence level, humans 
need the solidarity, cohesion and cooperation of a group. This very basic feature of human life 
generates a potential for conflict with other groups. Since the Westphalian Peace of 1648 in 
Europe the most important group has been the nation state, and the most important factor 
facilitating in-group unity is nationalism.
5
 Thus, the most salient object of study in international 
relations is the nation state. Moreover, structural realism does not make any assumption about 
the nature of the polity. It ignores cultural differences, regime types or which individuals are in 
power, because the international system generates the same fundamental incentives for all great 
powers.
6
  
Egoism or being motivated by self-interest is another defining feature of human life in the realist 
world, which translates into self-interest of the group and in a world of nation states that means 
the national interest. Even if certain conditions can facilitate altruistic behaviour, egoism is 
rooted in human nature and self-interest is ultimately the driver of political behaviour. When 
choices between collective and self-interest must be made, egoism is likely to overcome 
altruism.
7
 
Power centrism is the analytical heart of realism since power is a basic facet of politics. Power 
only makes sense as a relative concept as being strong implies that somebody else is weak.
8
 
Additionally, human affairs are marked by the existence of great inequalities in terms of 
resources and influence. Some social groups, be they empires, nation states or tribes are always 
bequeathed with a disproportionate amount of material means to get what they want. Thus, they 
exert influence and control a cut above the rest. This entails that political interaction permanently 
unfolds under the potential shadow of the use of material power to coerce.
9
 
These basic views of the nature and conditions of human life have vital impact on how one think 
about international politics. Group-identification, and therefore group-interaction, has a major 
impact on human affairs, which leads to group-interests and necessities trumping any alleged 
universal morality or ethics, and as a result makes it improbable that humankind will ever fully 
transcend power politics by way of the progressive power of reason. This again leads to a distinct 
realist approach to analysing, explaining, and understanding international politics - a focus on the 
most powerful units in the system; a disinclination to believe in declared foreign policy goals 
motivated by something else than state interests; and a proclivity to look beyond rhetoric to the 
power realities that is the undercurrent of international politics. 
                                                          
5
 Gilpin, Robert, No One Loves a Political Realist, p. 7-8, Security Studies, 5/3, pp. 3-26, 1996; Wohlforth, William C., 
Realism and Foreign Policy, in Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases, Smith, Steve; Hadfield, Amelia & Dunne Tim 
(eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
6
 Mearsheimer, John J., Structural Realism, p. 72, in Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve (eds.), International 
Relations: Theories, Discipline and Diversity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007 
7
 Mearsheimer, John J., The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 
1994-1995, p. 11. 
8
 Hyde-Price, Adrian, European Security in the Twenty-first Century, The Challenge of Multipolarity, Abingdon, 
Oxford, 2007, p. 35. 
9
 Gilpin, Robert, No One Loves a Political Realist, p. 7-8, Security Studies, 5/3, pp. 3-26, 1996; Wohlforth, William C., 
Realism and Foreign Policy, in Foreign Policy – Theories, Actors, Cases, Smith, Steve; Hadfield, Amelia & Dunne Tim 
(eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008 
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Studying the behaviour of states, not their intentions 
This thesis endeavours to understand and explain the military-strategic behaviour of China in the 
maritime domain within the ontological framework sketched out above – states, not statesmen, 
motivated by self-interest, and the material power they wield, not ideological inclination, is the 
object of study. This entails, that the analysis in this thesis explicitly omits considering whether 
the regime type of China has any bearing on its behaviour. Furthermore, who’s in charge of 
China’s foreign and defence policy matters not. The structural realist theoretical approach 
applied here means that when Xi Jinping took over the presidency of China from Hu Jintao on 14 
March 2013
10
 little will change in China’s strategic behaviour in the foreign policy arena. To the 
extent that the intentions of Xi Jinping are different to that of Hu Jintao the observer can only 
speculate. Indeed, one of the core assumptions of structural realism is the uncertainty of inten-
tions, as will be elaborated in the following chapter on the theoretical framework that this thesis 
works within. Other states observing and responding to China’s actions cannot know Beijing’s 
intentions for sure, not now and much less so years down the line, and neither can any resear-
cher. Methodologically speaking, this implies that one should refrain from the attempt to get 
inside a statesman’s head to figure out any future intensions. This can only amount to specula-
tion. What we can know with relative certainty is the development of capabilities, in other words 
what China can do, not what it wants to do. 
Realism is a parsimonious theory. It simplifies reality and makes abstract generalisations. It can 
not explain every aspect and detail of the complexities in international politics, nor does it try to. 
Waltz argues that structural realism must move away from reality to generate explanatory power, 
meaning that a full description of reality does not order it or provide understanding. An “elegant 
theory” that focuses and a number of key variables do.11 Mearsheimer compare neorealism to “a 
powerful flashlight in a dark room” that can illuminate the most important factors of internatio-
nal politics but will not suffice to shed light on every detail.
12
 
Realism is also often criticised for being a positivist theory, though Waltz himself claims that it 
is not. Positivism as a philosophy of science is derived from John Locke’s empiricism, i.e. that 
reality can only be understood through human senses and experiences. Appearances and not 
reality itself is what can be studied and thus it relies on inductive reasoning.
13
 Realism shares 
with positivism that the science of political science can be and should be pursued. International 
Relations theory should concern itself with what is and not what ought to be and accordingly 
realism is not a normative theory. However, realist theory relies on deductive reasoning so that 
conclusions and explanations of specific behaviour can be drawn on the basis of general 
assumptions. Realists of all breeds share the same epistemology. Realism functions on the 
assumption that there is an observable reality which can be investigated without being directly 
affected by the observer. 
                                                          
10
 Buckley, Chris, China’s new President Nods to Public Concerns, but Defends Power at Top, New York Times, 14 
March 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/world/asia/chinas-new-leader-xi-jinping-takes-full-
power.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed 26 April 2013. 
11
 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 40. 
12
 Mearsheimer, John J. - The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, N.W. Norton, 2001, p. 11. 
13
 Cited in Hyde-Price, Adrian, European Security in the Twenty-first Century, The Challenge of Multipolarity, p. 13. 
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Moreover structural realism does not shy away from causality: The structure of the international 
system forces states to behave in certain ways. The independent variable is the structure of the 
system, the dependent variable is state behaviour. Defensive realism sees the structure as 
compelling great powers to be status quo-seeking, offensive realism sees the same structural 
forces as driving states to be revisionist. This is the essence of the divide between Waltz and 
Mearsheimer. The classical realism of Morgenthau entailed the option that states could both be 
status quo or revisionist. Structural realism says that all great powers are either status quo 
(defensive) or revisionist (offensive). 
Theory blindness, i.e. being sure that a certain theoretical prediction must surely fit the reality of 
things, can be guarded against by making multiple hypotheses on the basis of theory. Accor-
dingly, it is indeed possible to “test” theories, and this is what this thesis intends to do - to test 
four different hypotheses regarding the military-strategic behaviour of China in the maritime 
domain. 
 
Testing the theory  
Generated from defensive and offensive realism, this thesis deduces four theoretically informed 
hypotheses and predicts corresponding naval force postures in each hypothesis. These hypo-
theses are then tested on the empirical data enabling us to say which hypothesis is best supported 
by China’s strategic behaviour and procurement patterns in the maritime domain. Secondly, it 
will shed light on which theoretical outlook has the most explanatory power. Is China a status 
quo power as defensive realism (Hypothesis 1 and 2) propose, or are is China a revisionist power 
in line with the presumption of offensive realism (Hypothesis 3 and 4)? 
 
Data collection 
Methodological problems concerning accessible information 
 
Ranking among any state’s best guarded secrets are the exact military capabilities and the 
performance data of its military hardware. Intelligence agencies of major powers spend enorm-
ous resources spying on each other to extract such information, and they often get it wrong. For 
example it is widely accepted, that the United States and its NATO allies had overestimated the 
military power of the Soviet Union right up until its collapse at the end of the Cold War. The 
non-existence of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is a recent example of 
misjudgement that gained almost instant notoriety. 
Hence, serious methodological difficulties present themselves when conducting empirical 
research on the strategic behaviour and aspirations of major powers. Revisionist powers will 
often conceal their intentions and do their best to hide the development of military capabilities to 
steer clear of confrontations with stronger status quo seeking contenders. Regarding China, many 
observers point out the nebulous nature of Chinese political decision making, and especially the 
nature of its military modernisation and strategy. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping’s 24 Character strategic 
guiding principle explicitly emphasise the prudence of hiding China’s military capabilities until 
the modernisation process of the country has fully matured. A case in point from the naval 
domain is China’s recently commissioned aircraft carrier. The former Soviet carrier Vayrag was 
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purchased in Ukraine by a private Chinese company in 1998 under the pretext of turning it into a 
floating casino in Macau.
14
 Instead, the Vayrag was towed to a shipyard where it was fully 
refitted with military equipment and subsequently launched as the new pride of the Chinese 
Navy. The Chinese Defence White Papers released in 2009 and 2011 never mentioned any 
carrier being introduced into the PLAN though the implications of such a vessel in operation are 
significant. 
 
Bean counting and net assessment 
 
One method of data collection in this field of research is bean counting. In its most basic form, 
bean counting consists of adding up units in given areas, and matching up numbers against a 
potential rival to gauge the relative strength of a state vis-à-vis another state. This approach has 
been criticized for being too simplistic, not taking into account issues like the training of person-
nel, combat experience, officer education, moral, and so forth.
15
 The critique has come from 
practitioners of net assessment, an approach to evaluating military balances with a more holistic 
political-military measurement of the capabilities of a given state. 
16
 The critique of the bean 
counting approach raised from the corner of net assessment is legitimate. Measuring the actual 
war readiness understood as a state’s employment of its human and material military capabilities 
is, of course, better understood if one has access to a wide range of data on all the areas that 
come together to constitute an country’s fighting skill. Unfortunately, a lot of the information is 
classified and hence not accessible for researchers.
17
 That being said, a lot of open-source 
information is available.  
 
Enhanced bean counting 
 
This thesis applies what can be labelled enhanced bean counting - ‘enhanced’ meaning not just 
counting units, but taking in to account what each unit is actually capable of. It is essential in the 
investigation of China’s strategic behaviour not only to distinguish between types and numbers 
of units and count them, but also to examine the technical specifications and capabilities of the 
ships and their equipment and weaponry. 
More specifically, I have compiled a great deal of data to document the actual capabilities of 
China’s naval forces as accurately with the sources available (on sources see immediately 
below). I have made an effort in creating a reliable set of empirical data that has been 
meticulously cross-referenced between the primary sources of data as far as possible. To test the 
hypotheses and predicted postures, I have used this method of so-called enhanced bean counting 
                                                          
14
 As implausible as the story may sound, China is actually already home to Minsk World, a theme park based on an 
ex-Soviet aircraft carrier in Shenzhen, and a carrier-themed amusement park, Tianjin Binhai Aircraft Carrier Theme 
Park. 
15
 Skypek, Thomas A. (2010), Evaluating Military Balances Through the Lens of Net Assessment: History and 
Application, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, vol. 12, issue 2, p. 6. 
16
 Cohen, Eliot A. (1998), Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance, 
International Security, vol. 13, no. 1 
17
 Skypek, Thomas A. (2010), Evaluating Military Balances Through the Lens of Net Assessment: History and 
Application, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, vol. 12, issue 2, pp. 9-10. 
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in order to gauge the actual capabilities of the Chinese Navy and thus explain the strategic 
behaviour of China. 
The year 1997 is chosen as a starting point for two reasons. Firstly, the modernisation of the 
Chinese Navy began in earnest in the beginning of the 1990s but did not discernibly start to have 
an impact on observable hardware acquisitions until the middle of the decade. Secondly, the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 is widely believed to have had a catalytic effect on China’s 
determination to build a modern navy. The U.S. navy’s show of force and China’s inability to 
prevent American carrier strike groups from steaming into the Strait was a major wake-up call 
for China that underscored its relative weakness in the naval domain.  
 
Sources 
 
The primary data sources utilised in this thesis relies on authoritative sources such as IHS Jane’s 
Fighting Ships, The U.S. Naval Institute’s Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, and The 
Military Balance by International Institute for Strategic Studies from 1997-2013.  
The Military Balance is commonly acknowledged to be accurate and it is widely used and 
referenced in academic journals. The Military Balance is for the most part up to date, but 
catalogues defence assets either at the start of a year or at the end of the preceding year. I have 
therefore made extensive use IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships and other relevant publications under the 
IHS Jane’s portfolio to obtain data on individual ships, but also to be as up to date and accurate 
as possible with the number of ships commissioned into the PLAN, especially for the years 2012 
and 2013. For example, the Military Balance 2013 lists 7 Yuan-class attack submarines (SSK), 
but according to Jane’s Fighting Ships, that is continuously updated, a whole of 12 boats of the 
class have been commissioned into the Chinese Navy.  
Jane’s Fighting Ships is widely used as the go-to supplier for reliable open-source data and 
intelligence gathering and is also referred to in peer-reviewed journal articles, as well as official 
government reports on military matters. When using the IHS Jane’s electronic data base the dates 
given in references in this thesis are the dates listed as ‘latest update.’ Therefore, I do not make 
references like Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, but refer to the entry time of the data base 
update..  
 
A remark on documenting the empirical data  
 
As mentioned the chosen applied method is enhanced bean counting, i.e. counting and 
distinguishing carefully between units. The empirical data presented in this thesis data has been 
compiled by me from authoritative sources as accounted for above. Two major components of 
naval forces are submarines and major surface combatants. The evolution of these two chief 
elements of China’s Navy come in the form of very large tables with the object of  documenting 
the development of China’s naval capabilities over time. They have been included as appendices. 
In the presentation of data and in the discussion regarding each hypothesis I refer to the tables in 
the appendices. Because of the volume the tables can not meaningfully be embedded in the text 
in full scale, and key data are therefore presented in extract and in the form of graphic figures. 
11 
 
 
 
 
The reader is kindly advised to consult the tables in appendices for the detailed empirical docu-
mentation on the matters referred to in the text. 
 
Terminology 
A text dealing with military matters contains a lot of abbreviations, known to the scholar in this 
field but otherwise illegible. I use the abbreviations because they appear in this form in the litera-
ture and for the sake of readability. A list of abbreviations is included in an appendix. 
III:  Theoretical Framework 
 
As mentioned realism is concerned with the world as it actually is not how it ought to be. In 
other words, it is an empirical rather than a normative paradigm. Realism is also quite pessi-
mistic and emphasizes the recurrent patterns of power politics as manifested by reoccurring con-
flicts, rivalries, and wars between groups of humans. Changes in the balance of power and the 
logic of power politics have been a stable of realist thinking since the account of the Pelopon-
nesian Wars by Thucydides in the Fifth Century BC when he observed that ”what made war 
inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”18  
Thucydides found some causes of war to be rooted in the system in which states take part and 
that the relative distribution of power between the units in the system had a decisive influence on 
their relations with one another. Particular attention must therefore be afforded to great powers 
as they have the most leverage on the international stage. With the discussion of whether a small 
state should stand by its ideals or acknowledge its relative weakness Thucydides in the Melinian 
Dialogue famously stated that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak 
accept what they must accept.”19  
Realist theorists are fond of tracing their historical merits back through the millennia from other 
of the classical texts by Kautilya
20
, Machiavelli
21
, and Hobbes
22
, to modern realist thinkers as 
E.H. Carr
23
 and Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau was the first to establish “realism” as an ap-
proach to the study of international relations more than 50 years ago in his ground breaking book 
published a few years after the end of Second World War.
24
 Besides being assaulted from va-
rious theoretical rivals, mainly liberalism, institutionalism, democratic peace theory and later 
                                                          
18
 Cited in Kauppi, Mark V., Thycudides: Character and Capabilities, p. 142, in Frankel, Benjamin (ed.), Roots of 
Realism, London, Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1996. 
19
 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, The Melinian Dialogue, (Book 5, Chapter 17), available at Internet Classics 
Archive at MIT, http://www.wellesley.edu/ClassicalStudies/CLCV102/Thucydides--MelianDialogue.html. To be 
precise, this translation by Richard Crawley actually reads  “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what 
they must”. I have chosen to use the more common translation, as found in Perry, Marvin & Chase, Myrna & 
Jacob, James & Jacob, Margaret and Von Laue, Theodore H., Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics, and Society, 
Volume 1: To 1789, p. 70, Wadsworth, Boston, Tenth edition, 2012. 
20
 Kautilya’s Arthashastra, written about 300 BC, R. Shamasastry’s English translation, 1915; available at 
http://www.sdstate.edu/projectsouthasia/Docs/index.cfm. 
21
 Machiavelli, Nicolo, The Prince, written c 1505, published 1515, English Translation W.K. Marriot, available at 
http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince.pdf.  
22
 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, London, 1651. 
23
 Carr, E.H., The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, London, Macmillan, 1946. 
24
 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948. 
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constructivism, realism itself diversified into splinter groups. Most significantly was Kenneth 
Waltz’s introduction of “neorealism” in the late 1970s. 25  Hereafter, Morgenthau’s original 
realism became known as “classical”. From that time on, numerous other subcategories and 
variants of realism have bloomed, including two kinds of “structural realism”, “three kinds of 
offensive realism”, and various sorts of “defensive realism” besides the inevitable “neoclassical 
realism”. Although the so-called “English School” of IR-theory advocated by Barry Buzan has 
claimed the term “structural”, Waltz uses the phrases structural realism and neorealism inter-
changeably, and so shall I.
 26
 Exploring the theoretical dispute inside the realist canon could be a 
book-length exercise in academic hair-splitting. While that could surely be both a captivating 
and worthwhile effort, it is the aim of neither this chapter nor of this thesis. Nevertheless, one 
should be aware of these historical deep-seated divides in realism, between classical realism and 
neorealism, and between offensive and defensive realism. The latter discord became particularly 
pronounced with the publication of John J. Mearsheimer’s account of his version offensive 
realism in 2001.
27 
Waltz and Mearsheimer has come to be the premier advocates of defensive and offensive 
structural realism respectively, and more or less all other subsequent International Relations 
theory has had to relate to their seminal work, either in opposition to realism or in praise of it. 
This thesis operates within the boundaries of the structural realist theoretical framework, and it is 
on the basis of Waltz and Mearsheimer I make propositions and hypothesize on the rise of China 
in the maritime domain. 
 
Structural Realist Assumptions  
 
The following five assumptions
28
 are the bedrock of structural realist thought: The system is 
anarchic and, survival is the primary goal, great powers and almost all states possess offensive 
capabilities, no state can be certain about others’ intentions, and actors are rational. 
The first assumption is that the main actors in international politics are great powers and that 
they operate in an anarchic system. Anarchy is the ruling principle but that is not the same as 
saying that the international system is necessarily characterised by chaos and disorder; it only 
implies that there is no higher authority in the international system than the state. As understood 
in realist literature, the term anarchic is an ordering principle saying that the international system 
consists of states as independent political units. The state is not the only actor in the international 
system, but is by far the most important one. 
The second assumption is that all states hold a certain degree of offensive military capability and 
have the power to harm other states. Hence, states are potentially dangerous to each other, and 
the distribution of military capabilities in the state system is a conditioning factor in a state’s 
strategic behaviour.  
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The third assumption is that states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. Intensions are 
impossible to determine with certainty, and while a state may show no signs of malign intentions 
to another state, one cannot rule out for sure the possibility of the first state’s aggressive inten-
sions in the future. Besides, intentions can change over time and a present ally might be the rival 
of tomorrow. 
The fourth assumption is that the primary goal of any state is survival. States want to maintain 
their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and control over domestic political affairs. Other goals 
that a state might pursue are secondary. That does not mean that all actions of states are deter-
mined by security concerns, and states do evidently pursue a wide range of foreign policy goals, 
but it means that security interests takes precedence over other matters. If the security of a state, 
or indeed its survival, is threatened, it cannot pursue any other goal or interest it might entertain. 
The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors that think and act strategically to ensure its 
survival in the international system. States are able to make rational strategic choices because 
they understand the international system, and have a sense of the relative power of the units 
within the system. This does not imply that states cannot make wrong decisions. The room for 
miscalculation is considerable, so a failed foreign policy is not evidence of a state acting irra-
tionally, but rather the result of misperception, or simply making a wrong bet and losing it. 
Structural realism departs from this set of assumptions, which form the basis of the reasoning, 
and most realists would not find much to quarrel about here. The above five assumptions are as 
Mearsheimer has formulated them. Other realists theorists, of course, has advocated for a differ-
rent set or combination as core tenets of realist theory. Adrian Hyde-Price list as a core assump-
tion of neorealism that states are functionally alike, a point also raised by Waltz.
29
 
 
Defensive Realism - Kenneth N. Waltz 
 
Waltz avers that the anarchy of the international system entails that its units can rely on nobody 
but themselves to guarantee their survival, and hence the primary aim of the state is security. The 
security of any unit is compromised with an increase in the power of other units in the system. 
This is not so because one has the intention to harm another, but because a relative advantage in 
power makes it possible for them to do so. Therefore, states care deeply about their position in 
the balance of power.
30
  Structural realism occupies itself with capabilities rather than intentions, 
and what make states fear is the ability to hurt or coerce another. This means that the best way to 
stay safe is to be stronger than your opponents. Whatever measures a state takes to enhance its 
own security it does so at the expense of others, inducing a similar behaviour in the other units in 
the system. This traps states in a security dilemma regardless of whether or not they have any 
aggressive intentions because “the source of one’s own comfort is the source of another’s 
worry.” 31  This is the foundation of the neorealist answer to why states pursue power and 
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ultimately fight wars. Power is the best way for the state to ensure security and survival. Unlike 
classical realists, power is not an end in itself, but the means to an end, survival, and this dooms 
states to live in everlasting security competition. It also entails that the struggle for power will 
always be a ‘zero-sum’ game even though power is an unlimited resource, because states are 
concerned with relative gains as opposed to absolute gains. An even small increase of the power 
of a state is perceived as a potential threat by other states. 
Even so, Waltz assets that prudent statesmen will seek an appropriate amount of power because 
“excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and pool their efforts against 
the dominant state.”32 States then try to be only moderately more powerful than their potential 
rivals in order to increase the possibility of their own survival. Superfluous power accumulation 
is counter-productive because it provokes the other great powers in the system will rally and 
check the rising state. Therefore, states should not aspire to become a hegemon, either in their 
own region or globally.
33
 Although states then do seek incremental increases in power vis-à-vis 
other states, their main aim is to make sure that others do not grow more powerful at their 
expense. According to Waltz, the chief concern of states then “is not to maximize power, but to 
maintain their position in the system.”34 This results in states having few incentives to behave 
offensively, which is why Waltz’ theory has been charged with having a ‘status-quo bias.’35 
Indeed, the structure of the international system does not only discourage aggressive behaviour, 
it drives states to concentrate on maintaining their position in the balance of power. Hence, the 
structural realist theory of Waltz is termed defensive realism.  
 
Defensive Realist Predictions on the Rise of China 
 
The defensive realism of Waltz has a more optimistic standpoint on the prospect of China rising 
peacefully. China will increase its military prowess and attempt to better its position in the 
balance of power, and China’s neighbours and the U.S. will balance against China to contain it. 
Defensive realism does not predict that security competition will vanish, but it will not be so 
fierce exactly because China, as all states, realises that unyielding power maximisation in the 
pursuit of regional hegemony is in the end self-defeating. Furthermore, defensive realists believe 
that nuclear weapons also add to the possibility of China rising peacefully alongside its neigh-
bours. It is very hard to expand when faced with another nuclear power and that seriously 
dampers the possibility for war.  Nuclear weapons do not abolish security completion, as was 
clearly evident between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. But large-
scale major war between nuclear-armed adversaries is less likely because of the massive costs a 
retaliatory nuclear strike involves. China realises this and will limit its aims accordingly and will 
therefore be easily contained and possible to cooperate with. In other words, if China does try to 
maximise its power and dominate Asia, it is strategically unwise behaviour. Continuous 
economic growth and rise on the global political stage is best pursued not by reaching for the 
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crown of regional hegemony and building a navy with large power projection capabilities, but by 
attaining a relatively defensive military capability focused on deterrence and periphery defence. 
 
Hypothesis 1 - Securing the Realm 
 
Security competition will persist in North East Asia, but the room for cooperation is big and the 
risk of conflict low. The structural forces bearing down on China are relatively benign, and the 
increasing integration into global trade and the world economy leaves China with little incentive 
to rock the boat. After all, the two decades of unprecedented growth in China has been taking 
place under exactly the conditions of U.S. supremacy that offensive realism claims China will 
eventually seek to upset. 
By accepting the U.S. to ensure global maritime trade, and in effect controlling Chinese sea lines 
of communication (SLOC), China is also if not accepting then at least living with the potential 
chokehold the Americans have on Chinese trade in general and oil seaborne energy supply in 
particular in a time of crisis. So far, this has served China well, the U.S. has provided the mari-
time security needed for China to engage in and profit tremendously from seaborne trade. China 
acknowledges the U.S. as the premier naval power in the Western Pacific, and will not seek to 
challenge this fact, thus having no need to expand its navy aggressively. 
Nevertheless, the structural forces will compel China to modernize and increase its naval power, 
but the likelihood of war is very small, because there is so much more to gain from cooperation. 
Economic interaction and trade will dampen the security competition, and China will not pursue 
a large navy with power projection capabilities that could threaten and frighten its neighbours. 
Engaging in an aggressive naval build up would be foolish as it would scare China’s neighbours 
into forming a balancing coalition led by the United States. 
According to Waltz we should therefore see China balance the power of the U.S. and its allies, 
notably Japan and South Korea, in the region, but only up to a certain degree. Reckless power 
expansion and avowedly offensive weaponry will not feature prominently in the Chinese Navy. 
In the naval domain, the balancing behaviour of China will focus on deterring an invasion from 
the sea and, increasing and modernising its capabilities to fight off an enemy in its coastal 
regions. 
 
Predicted Posture:  
 
 Consolidation of the “Near Coast” strategy. With no ambition to dominate the regional 
seas, China will modernise, strengthen, and build up its coastal defence forces. 
 A limited number of nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBN) for 
assured nuclear deterrence and second strike capability. 
 Small and short-range conventional-powered submarines such as will be the focus of the 
PLAN’s submarine force. The relatively shallow waters off the Chinese littoral do not 
require large ocean-going submarines. 
 Littoral warfare vessels such as missile-armed patrol craft, and coastal antisubmarine 
ships able to fend off enemy ships close to Chinese shores. 
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Geographical extension: Coastal orientation only in doctrine and hardware. The reach of PLANs 
conventional submarines and littoral combat ships restricts the range which the PLAN will be 
able to launch operations, more or less within China’s territorial waters. 
 
Hypothesis 2 - Balancing the Hegemon and Its Regional Allies 
 
The substantial and continuous growth in U.S. defence spending and increasing focus on Asia 
and the Western Pacific has not gone unnoticed by China. Furthermore, China has also taken 
note of the increase in naval power of other regional actors. China does not have expansionist 
aims and does not seek to dominate its region, but nonetheless feels compelled to balance against 
the growing naval power of the other countries in East Asia. Japan is increasing its naval power 
and have for the first time in more than three decades decided to deploy more submarines. South 
Korea is pursuing a transition from brown water to blue water navy capabilities and is investing 
heavily in submarines. India is striving to operate two carrier strike groups in the near future and 
is engaging in extensive naval modernization. Vietnam is also becoming a player in the maritime 
domain, and Australia and Indonesia are likewise investing in naval assets and increasing their 
focus on China. This accumulates into a sense of encirclement or outright containment in China 
and hence fuels the Chinese need to build up its naval forces to guarantee its own security. China 
is simply trying to retain its position in the balance of power. 
This is defensively motivated behaviour, not driven by revisionist aims but by fear of falling 
behind. China is status quo-seeking and aims to retain its position in the balance of power in East 
Asia. The strictly littoral navy predicted in Hypothesis 1 is deemed insufficient to effectively 
counter the growing clout of other regional navies and China is obliged to field a more potent 
navy. Therefore, the Chinese Navy will build on the force posture portrayed above. 
Predicted Posture: 
 
 Larger coastal combatants such as corvette-sized ships that can check an opponent further 
from the Chinese coast to augment the guided-missile fast attack craft deemed enough for 
strictly littoral combat. 
 Surface vessels suitable for autonomous deployment that can meet a potential enemy 
relatively far off the Chinese coast, as opposed to integrated units with each ship assigned 
a specific purpose in the group. Guided missile destroyers (DDG) and guided missile 
frigates (FFG) with expected capabilities including layered anti-air defence systems to 
defend themselves against aircraft and anti-ship missiles. In addition, anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) capabilities with at least two different kinds of sonar systems, one hull-
mounted, another buoy-based (towed-array) and perhaps assisted by helicopter-borne 
sonar for some kind of triangulation. Shore-based assistance cannot be guaranteed thus 
necessitating independent defensive systems. 
 Increase in numbers of conventional-powered submarines of small to medium size, 
roughly around 2000 tonnes. China’s older submarines are likely to be replaced by more 
modern classes, armed not only with torpedoes but also with anti-ship missiles to deter 
enemy forces from venturing close to the Chinese littoral. 
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 Deployment of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). An ASBM deterrence would be a 
unique Chinese capability and if operational would constitute an obstacle for U.S. 
carriers to operate strike groups from within the first island chain. 
Geographical extension: Roughly to the limit of China’s exclusive economic zone, about 200 
nautical miles (nm) from the Chinese coast, to be able to check an opponent well before they 
reach Chinese coastal waters. 
 
Offensive Realism - John J. Mearsheimer 
 
The offensive realism of Mearsheimer asserts that great powers ”maximize their relative 
power.”36 In that respect he is closer to Morgenthau’s claim that a perpetual power-struggle is 
the result of man’s innate lust to dominate others, the ‘animus dominandi.’37 However, unlike 
Morgenthau, Mearsheimer does not find the source of causation in human nature but in the 
anarchical structure of the international system. What drives states to accumulate as much power 
as possible is a search for security. Security as the motivator and structure as causation associates 
Mearsheimer with Waltz, obviously, but the two differ on the crucial point of how much power 
is enough. Waltz thinks that the pursuit of power has its limits, indeed, too much of it is self-
defeating, but Mearsheimer sees the search for power and security as unquenchable: 
“For defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek 
additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of 
power. [...] Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely 
found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for 
states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage 
of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the 
hegemon in the system.”38 
As noted above, Waltz perceives such relentless power maximization as counter-productive, and 
evidently believes that an amount of sufficient security to guarantee survival tenable. The power 
needed to ensure this is surely markedly less than the ‘hegemonic’ amount suggested by 
Mearsheimer. 
Mearsheimer outlines an international system consisting of ‘insular’ and ‘continental’ great 
powers that all aspire to regional hegemony through the build-up of military capabilities.
39
 The 
great powers engage in regional balancing as well as balancing across the regions of the world. 
Mearsheimer discard the perception that the world has become unipolar after the Cold War and 
the belief that the U.S. is a global hegemon. Not only does he identify Russia and China as great 
powers that, despite the predominance of U.S. power, can contest and impede an American 
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invasion of their homeland,
40
 but Mearsheimer put great emphasis on “the stopping power of 
water.”41 Great powers cannot conquer each other over vast expanses of water such as the 
Pacific Ocean, so geography matters a good deal since it divides the world into regions. Thus 
regional hegemony is attainable and desirable for great powers. Global hegemony is next to 
impossible except if a state acquires “clear-cut nuclear superiority” defined as “a capability to 
devastate its rivals without fear of retaliation.”42 Assuming that this highly unlikely scenario 
does not unfold, hegemony can only be regional. The United States is the only regional hegemon 
in modern history with its domination of the Western hemisphere, but even so it is not satisfied. 
A regional hegemon will strive to prevent the rise of “peer competitors” by trying to maintain a 
balance of power between at least two great powers in other regions with a potential hegemon. If 
the international system contains only one hegemon it will be a status quo power because it has 
achieved the ultimate goal any state can entertain, regional hegemony and no rivals in the rear 
view mirror. Other great powers that are not regional hegemons are by nature revisionist as they 
seek to maximize their share of world power.
 43
 Therefore, the structural realism of Mearsheimer 
is labelled offensive realism. 
 
Offensive Realist Predictions on the Rise of China 
 
Offensive realism takes a quite pessimistic view on the possibility of China rising peacefully. 
China’s ultimate goal is to become the regional hegemon of Asia, and it will increase its military 
power to make sure that no other Asian state can credibly threaten it. 
China’s military expansion and potential regional dominance will cause most of China’s 
maritime neighbours, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines to 
join the U.S. to contain China. Their goal would to form a balancing coalition with the aim of 
containing China and in the end weaken it so much that it doesn’t constitute a threat any longer. 
The USA will not tolerate the rise of peer competitors and a potential regional hegemon in North 
East Asia and together with its allies the U.S. will engage in intense security competition with 
China, just as they did in Europe with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China’s goal on the 
other hand is to eventually push the Americans out of Northeast Asia, just as the U.S. squeezed 
the European great powers out of the Western hemisphere in the nineteenth century. 
Taiwan is a crucial issue since its geographic location gives it great importance in controlling the 
sea lanes of East Asia. For that reason alone, it is unlikely that the U.S. and Japan would accept 
China controlling Taiwan. For the same reason, China wants to unite Taiwan with mainland 
China. Hence, Taiwan will be a central issue in any anti-China balancing coalition, which will 
rile China and fuel the security competetion between Beijing and Washington. 
Offensive realism recognises that nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of war between states, 
but not that it will lessen the security competition and power maximizing behaviour of China. 
After all, nuclear weapons did not hinder military build-up between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. 
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Hypothesis 3 - In Pursuit of Regional Dominance 
 
China will seek to be the premier naval power within the first island chain and into the waters 
beyond that. It will build a navy with some power projection capability that can overwhelm 
China’s smaller maritime neighbours and change the balance of power in the region. Hence, 
China’s strategic behaviour will be revisionist in nature. 
 China will continue to take a forceful stance in the East China Sea with regards to Japan and its 
American ally, and Beijing will uncompromisingly assert its claims in the territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea. China will construct a navy that can handle these disputes and take the 
contested islands by force and hold them if need be. The development of power projection 
capabilities is not directly aimed at the U.S. Navy, but to establish the Chinese navy as the 
dominant force vis-à-vis other countries in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and 
the Philippines. The PLAN will seek to have the capabilities to ensure that China effectively 
makes a Taiwanese declaration of independence ever less likely. This includes anti-access/area 
denial (A2AD) strategy that is indeed aimed at deterring, denying or delaying U.S. intervention 
in China’s Near Seas demarcated by the first island chain. 
China will insistently maximise its power, but avoid confrontation with the system leader. China 
accepts that it cannot match American naval power in Western Pacific and that the PLAN will 
not have the capabilities to do so in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, China’s strategic 
behaviour will be characterised by building up naval forces even though it risks provoking 
balancing behaviour by other countries in the region. The  attaining an offensive posture 
 
Predicted Posture: 
 
 Amphibious assault capabilities to enforce claims on disputed islands such as the 
Diaoyou/Senkaku Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, and the Scarborough 
Shoal. Such amphibious capabilities are operating in groups and do not need to be 
multifunctional vessels suitable for autonomous deployment. 
 Large and advanced submarine force with medium-sized conventional-powered 
submarines (SSK) up to 3000 tonnes, augmented by nuclear-powered attack submarines 
(SSN). China will continue the build up of an imposing underwater fighting force 
equipped with advanced weaponry such as anti-ship cruise missiles. 
 Aircraft carrier programme capable of offering limited power projection capabilities, 
furthering China’s status as a dominant major regional naval force more directed against 
other regional powers and not against the United States. 
Geographical extension: China’s Near Seas - the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South 
China Sea, with an A2AD capability within the first island chain. 
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Hypothesis 4 - Extra-Regional  Ambitions 
 
China wants to dominate Asia the way the United States dominate the Western hemisphere. 
China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbours Russia and Japan, 
aspiring to severe military superiority, so that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. 
A conquering rampage and territorial expansion on the Asian landmass is not the purpose of 
China’s military might. Rather, like with the U.S. in the Americas, China wants to be able to 
dictate acceptable behaviour in its region and to have its way on issues that matters to China.  
China will continue to expand and modernize its navy and intensely pursue the development of a 
blue-water navy with serious power projection capabilities. This includes developing the 
capabilities to confidently operate in distant seas and into the Indian Ocean to the west and the 
Western Pacific beyond Japan to the east. 
China knows that such aggressive behaviour will trigger a balancing coalition, but is also knows 
that the only way around this problem is to maximize its power even further. This entails that 
China’s naval development is aimed at rivalling the U.S. Navy in the  a navy China’s strategic 
behaviour will be extremely revisionist in nature, aiming at regional hegemony.  
 
Predicted Posture: 
 
 China will invest heavily in large ocean going submarines. Big nuclear powered attack 
submarines (SSN) are a major constituent. Nuclear ballistic submarines carrying nuclear 
nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) will increase in number and 
ensure China a credible second strike capability and first-rate deterrence capability. 
 China will continue to deploy long-range ocean going surface vessels suitable for 
autonomous deployment such as with such as multifunctional destroyers and frigates with 
layered air defence and sophisticated radar, sonar, and weapons systems. 
 Replenishment at sea (RAS) vessels and other support vessels intended to enable 
continuous deployment far off Chinese shores, indeed in distant regions. 
 China will also pursue its aircraft carrier ambitions with great vigour. China will launch 
more aircraft carriers in the years to come, and build the support vessels needed to form 
carrier strike groups that will constitute major power projection capabilities. This is of 
course coupled with expansion in numbers and quality of naval aviation units. 
Geographical extension: The high seas, including the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean 
Region. 
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Graphic illustration of relations between hypotheses 
 
The figure represents the four hypotheses as continuous layers of ambition .The hypotheses are 
theoretically informed predictions, but they should not necessarily be viewed as mutually 
exclusive, but rather as the reach of strategic scope and geographical extension. For example, if 
the data is supportive of H4 it does not mean that China will forsake the capabilities predicted in 
H3, H2, and H1. So each ring represents additional capabilities, meaning that data supporting H4 
does not mean a significant reduction in Chinese coastal warfare capabilities or lessening of 
A2AD missile capabilities.  
 
 
 
With regards to geographical extension, a furthering of ability to control maritime territory 
presupposes control of waters closer to Chinese shores. For example, capabilities developed for 
operations within the first island chain naturally mean that defence of littoral waters is not 
neglected. On the other hand, data suggesting a long-term commitment to blue water navy 
capabilities such as large destroyers capable of autonomous deployment does not automatically 
mean that China has attained full control of its regional waters. 
  
H4 - Extra-
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Ambitions 
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Regional 
Dominance 
H2 - Balancing the 
Hegemon and Its 
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IV: Securing the Realm - testing Hypothesis 1 
 
Predicted Posture:  
 
 Consolidation of the “Near Coast” strategy. With no ambition to dominate the regional 
seas, China will modernise, strengthen, and build up its coastal defence forces. 
 A limited number of nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBN) for 
assured nuclear deterrence and second strike capability. 
 Small and short-range conventional-powered submarines such as will be the focus of the 
PLAN’s submarine force. The relatively shallow waters off the Chinese littoral do not 
require large ocean-going submarines. 
 Littoral warfare vessels such as missile-armed patrol craft, and coastal antisubmarine 
ships able to fend off enemy ships close to Chinese shores. 
Geographical extension: Coastal orientation only in doctrine and hardware. The reach of PLANs 
conventional submarines and littoral combat ships  restricts the range which the PLAN will be 
able to launch operations, more or less within China’s territorial waters. 
Coastal defence has been the strategic approach of the Chinese Navy for at least the first four 
decades of the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Such an approach to maritime 
security will have its major focus on naval capabilities designed to secure the coastal regions of 
China from a seaborne invasion. If Beijing has no aspirations to become a serious sea power, 
China will continue to concentrate its military power around the PLA ground forces protecting 
its land borders. Consequently, the PLAN will remain the maritime equivalent tasked with 
border defence. The focal point of naval development and procurement will be directed to 
coastal defence equipment, not only as part of a natural modernisation process of military 
hardware that gradually become obsolete. The coastal defence of the PLAN is expected not only 
to be maintained and modernised but significantly built up and constitute the chief force posture. 
Initially, we shall start with having a brief look at the legacy of the Chinese Navy and why it has 
historically been focused on coastal defence. This permits an understanding of how and why 
China would continue with such a strategy. In addition, it serves as a backdrop for analysis of the 
hypotheses in subsequent chapters, providing historical depth for understanding and explaining 
Chinese strategic behaviour in the maritime domain. 
 
The Legacy of the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
 
China has an extensive coastline of roughly 18,000 km, and the difficulty of establishing 
efficient and useful control over such an elongated line of defence had prompted naval defence 
to focus on strategically important areas. China’s coastal defence strategy incorporated the 
approximate 12 nautical miles (nm) of territorial waters that stretches seaward from China’s 
coastline, and about 300 kilometres (km) inland, a region in which China’s economically and 
politically important cities are situated. These included the straits and waterways that enemy 
forces could take advantage of when attempting to invade China by sea to conquer land targets 
23 
 
 
 
 
of strategic importance. Examples of this include the Strait of Bohai which is the maritime entry 
to Tianjin and Beijing, and relates to the security of the north coast of China; the Strait of Taiwan 
that concerns the security of China’s east coast and the question of Taiwanese reunification of 
Taiwan with mainland China; and the Strait of Qiongzhou and securing the island of Hainan and 
China’s south coast. The deployment of the three PLAN fleets, the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea 
Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet, corresponds with the defence of these straits and contiguous seas 
as the focal point of Chinese coastal defence.
44
 
 
Geostrategic Environment - Primacy of Land Forces 
 
Throughout most of the history of communist rule in China, the country’s strategic security 
environment has been decidedly continental in nature. Facing the Soviet Union on its northern 
borders, India in the Himalayas to southwest, and the United States positioned in Korea in the 
northeast, China could not afford to allocate much attention or resources to its navy. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the main concern of the PLA was relatively small-scale coastal 
incursions by Taiwanese Kuomintang forces (KMT), expected as be preparations for major 
offensives to recapture mainland China. For the purpose of countering this, the PLA focused its 
attention on coastal defence forces, rather than the navy itself. Mao’s China surely had plans to 
invade and capture Taiwan as well, and the People’s Liberation Army had amassed its forces for 
invasion preparations across the Strait. In 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean War the 
situation changed. In its own account, China had repeatedly warned the Americans first not to 
cross the 38
th
 parallel separating North from South Korea, then not to take Pyongyang and 
thirdly not to go too close the Yalu River and thereby directly “threaten the security of China.”45 
China proceeded to redeploy its troops from across the Taiwan Strait to the northeast close to the 
North Korean Border and eventually invaded North Korea to pre-empt the Americans and United 
Nations forces to overrun the North Korean Army completely and establish themselves on the 
banks of the Yalu River. In the end, Mao abandoned preparations to invade Taiwan when the 
U.S. Seventh Fleet positioned itself in the Taiwan Strait and effectively deterring China.
46
 With a 
full-scale land war in Korea against the world’s strongest force and the perceived threat from the 
Americans in Korea, the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in Taiwan, and the Americans and 
French in North Vietnam, China’s geostrategic security environment could hardly be more 
continental in nature. 
In 1954, China shelled the island of Jinmen in order to prevent Taiwan from assigning a security 
treaty with the U.S. and later the same year, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) bombed the Dachen 
Islands. Mao’s strategy of scarring the Taiwanese and Americans with a show of force did not 
pay off, and President Eisenhower did sign the security treaty and China backed off as the 
American Seventh Fleet intervened. Skirmishes between PLAN torpedo boats and KMT forces 
                                                          
44
 Nan Li, The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ”Near Coast” and ”Near Seas” to ”Far 
Seas”; Asian Security, vol. 5, no. 2, 2009, pp. 144-169; Military Balance, Chapter Six: Asia, Map 4, p. 197 
45
 As recalled by the Chinese foreign minister at the time, Chen Yi, in an interview with the Tokyo Journalist, 
published 26 June 1962, cited in Whiting, Allan Suess, China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan, International 
Security, Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall 2001, p. 106. 
46
 Ibid, p. 107-108. 
24 
 
 
 
 
continued in the Taiwan Strait, but China carefully avoided engaging American ships. After 
having abandoned plans to recapture Taiwan by force and being faced down by the U.S. China’s 
navy was all the more oriented on defence of the coast. However, the PLAN did play on 
offensive role in amphibious landing operations to capture islands from KTM forces. In January 
1955 China captured the Yi Jiangshan Islands, the last stronghold of Nationalists off the coast of 
Zhejiang Province.
47
 
In 1962, the Sino-Indian border war underscored the primacy of land forces in China’s security 
environment as the two Asian giants fought over their Himalayan border. The dispute continues 
to this day with no agreed border, but ending in a ceasefire at the so-called line of actual 
control.
48
 From 1958 and through the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet relationship had soured and clashes 
on the border took China and Russia to the brink of war. The border dispute was centred on 
centuries-long quarrels over territory going back at least to the seventeenth century. Russia 
claimed more land in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and in the end seized almost 3 
million square kilometres. Russia asserted its claim in a series of “unequal treaties” as they have 
been referred to by Chinese historians. China started to contest Soviet occupation of the 
territories by 1963 and after China’s demonstrated nuclear capability in 1964 both countries 
began building up its military forces along the border. In the second half of the 1960s, the Soviet 
Union continued to move troops to its Far East and increased its ground forces in the military 
districts on the Chinese border from 13 to 21 divisions. In 1969 tensions flared and armed 
clashes on the border cost the lives of approximately a thousand people.
49
  Reportedly, the Soviet 
Union were on the brink of launching a nuclear attack against China, but Washington warned 
Moscow that it would mean American nuclear strikes on Soviet cities if they escalated the 
conflict to the nuclear level.
50
 
 
This caused China to shift its attention from the United States to the Soviet Union as the most 
likely near term adversary. Accordingly, China began to emphasize its defence against a Soviet 
invasion from the north as opposed to its previous orientation towards the south and east. The 
Soviet Union could field a technologically much more advanced army than China, and hence the 
Chinese sought to counter that with its abundance space and manpower, guided by Mao 
Zedong’s notion of “people’s war”. By luring the enemy into the deep Chinese lands and seeking 
a prolonged war of attrition and guerrilla-style tactics of mobility and harassment in Chinese 
familiar territory, this would give the Chinese the needed time to blood-let and weaken the 
enemy until strategic offensives were feasible. This left the PLAN more or less irrelevant, since a 
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strategy of allowing the enemy deep into Chinese territory in effect made coastal defence 
unneeded.
51
 
When Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership in the late 1970s the guiding principle changed 
from “people’s war” to “people’s war under modern conditions”.52 The major strategic focus was 
still on a large scale war with the Soviet Union primarily fought be land forces, but more 
attention to the navy was underway, as China’s long coastline where many of its strategic assets 
and economic centres are located, constitutes its nautical flank. The Soviets could conceivably 
take advantage of this strategic and geographic vulnerability and seek to capture islands and 
straits and conduct amphibious-landing operations to capture strategic assets, advancing on both 
land and sea, and initiate a two-front assault from both the north and the south. Thus, the PLAN 
should augment the land-based defence and protect naval bases, harbours and airfields near the 
coast. Moreover, the Soviets would be operating far from its homeland and consequently long 
supply routes would be necessary and the merchant ships resupplying Soviet forces would be 
vulnerable and open for Chinese sabotage and ambush. Hence, the PLAN main task was then to 
conduct counter-amphibious-landing operations around the Chinese littoral, depending on 
geographic advantages such as the many natural harbours, bays and caves that could 
accommodate naval, air, artillery and missile forces and operating bases. Furthermore, by 
operating close to the coastline in smaller and faster ships, the PLAN would also be within the 
reach of land-based firepower and support.
53
  
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and bipolarity had geostrategic 
security ramifications that resonated across the planet in the winter of 1989. The implications for 
China were equally massive, rearranging the security architecture of the world, leaving the 
United States the undisputed military champion globally, and in northeast Asia by far the 
premier naval power. In short, the naval strategy of China throughout the 1970s and 1980s was 
designed to ensure national survival in a major war with the Soviet Union. The PLAN was not 
tasked with capturing lost or disputed territory. It was a strictly defensive strategy. 
We shall now turn to the examination of the specific force posture predicted in Hypothesis 1 and 
investigate if China’s strategic behaviour and naval modernisation is centred on the predicted 
force posture. The posture is in essence a continuation of the Near Coast defence strategy based 
on the legacy of the Chinese Navy as presented above in the contemporary environment in 
Northeast Asia. 
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Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarines 
 
China’s main nuclear deterrence is undertaken by the Second Artillery Force, the service 
responsible for the China’s conventional and nuclear ballistic missile arsenal. China’s strategic 
missile force ranks among the largest in the world with a wide assortment of short, intermediate, 
and medium range ballistic missiles (SRBM, IRBM, MRBM) as well as land-attack cruise 
missiles (LACM). Most imperative though is the estimated 72 intercontinental ballistic missiles 
capable of delivering nuclear warheads to most of the globe.
54
 
Even with the massive destructive power of the Second Artillery Force, a limited but modern 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) capability would greatly enhance China’s 
nuclear deterrence. Nuclear-armed missiles are innately defensive weapons. As mentioned 
earlier, territorial expansion and massive offensive wars are very hard to wage engage a nuclear 
armed opponent for fear of nuclear retaliation. The spoils of war are almost certainly not high 
enough to pay the price nuclear war would demand. SSBNs armed with intercontinental ballistic 
missiles are the ultimate deterrence. Possessing a second strike capability, meaning being able to 
retaliate with nuclear weapons after having suffered a nuclear attack greatly reduces the 
likelihood of being attacked much further. Lurking in the oceans, SSBNs are the epitome of an 
assured nuclear second strike capability. 
China’s search for a submarine-based nuclear deterrent has been long in the making. In 1960s 
and 1970s, when American and Soviet submarine design made great headway, China’s nuclear 
submarine development was marred by technical and systemic failures. After the deployment of 
the Han-class (Type-093) nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) in 1974, China started to 
make up for lost time in their pursuit of a sea-based nuclear deterrent.
55
 China’s leaders had long 
coveted possessing such a weapon, and their wishes were granted when the 6,604-ton Xia-class 
(Type-092) was launched in 1981 and commissioned in 1987, though the submarine was marred 
by many troubles. A second of class was reported launched in 1982 but unconfirmed reports 
have asserted that one of the boats was lost in an accident in 1985.
56
 The JL-1 Submarine 
Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) it carries are of the relative short range of 1700 km, and the 
single and by now ageing and troubled-plagued Xia never conducted a deterrent patrol, and it is 
not considered to be operationally deployed.
57
 
But the undersea nuclear deterrent capability of China is undergoing a generation change with 
the advent of the Jin-class (Type 094) SSBN. The Jin-class is a vast improvement over the Xia-
class, but considering the aforementioned massive problems that afflicted the Xia that is not 
saying much. The Jin-class is quite a bit bigger, suggesting longer range and endurance, though 
the actual tonnage displacement remains unknown.
58
 Even if one disregards the technical 
limitations of the Xia and JL-1, the simple fact that only a single boat was in existence in the 
PLAN until the advent of the Jin reduces its deterrence effect immensely. Several boats are 
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needed in order to entertain a continuous at-sea deployment as maintenance and repair work is 
regularly required which necessitates docking for long periods of time. China now fields three 
Jin-class SSBNs with one more boat in build, so at least four Jin-class SSBNs are certain. Some 
official American estimates assess that China will probably deploy five submarines of the Jin-
class.
59
 However, China’s new is probably not that impressive compare with the SSBNs of other 
countries. According to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, the Jin-class is noisier than the 
Russian Delta III-class SSBN build more than thirty years ago.
60
 Also, the Jin-class is relatively 
small. As mentioned, the exact tonnage displacement is unknown, but estimated at around 8000-
10000 tonnes. The American Ohio-class SSBN is twice the size at 19000 tonnes, and the Jin is 
outright dwarfed by the massive Russian Typhoon-class that displaces 26500 tonnes, making it 
three times as big as China’s new SSBN. Additionally, the Jin-class only has capacity for 12 JL-
2 SLBMs in comparison with the 20 SLBMs carried by the Typhoon
61
, and 24 by the Ohio.
62
 
Furthermore, the JL-2 SLBM is has been repeatedly delayed and it is not yet operational, 
although it probably will be within a few years time.
63
 On 18 April 2013, the Director of the U.S. 
Defence Intelligence Agency told Senate Armed Services Committee that the JL-2 and the Jin-
class SSBN "may reach initial operational capability around 2014."
64
 The range JL-2 SLBM is 
estimated at 7400 km.
65
 That would not make it able to target the U.S. homeland, except Alaska, 
from Chinese littoral waters as it would plunge into the water about 800 km from Seattle. In 
order to reach the 48 contiguous American states, the JL-2 would need to be fired from 
somewhere west of Hawaii.
66
 
 
Concluding on Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarines, regarding Hypothesis 1 
 
In sum, China has achieved a mediocre sea-based nuclear deterrent, assuming the JL-2 is 
successfully deployed. Four Jin-class SSBNs will provide Beijing with an SSBN fleet close to 
having a near-continuous at sea presence. Compared with the abundance of American nuclear 
strategic missile submarines and the Russian undersea mammoth, the Chinese SSBN fleet is not 
much to boast about. But compared to where China was less than a decade ago, with an old, 
small, accident prone, and nonoperational single Xia-class SSBN, the introduction of the Jin-
class is big accomplishment and impressive stride. As such, the current SSBN fleet of the 
Chinese Navy corresponds well with the predicted posture.  
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Conventional Submarines 
 
H1 envisions China to invest in a conventional-powered submarine force with relatively small 
boats to operate in the Chinese littoral. Well into the 2000s, China relied on Soviet-designed 
Romeo-class submarines that the PLAN had procured and deployed in substantial numbers, as 
well as the Ming-class, China’s domestically produced version of the Romeo. The SSK fleet of 
Romeos and Mings was indeed quite impressive by the numbers. From 1997-2002, China 
continued to build more of the Ming-class, and in 2005 it deployed 19 submarines of the Ming-
class and 35 of the Romeo-class. From then on though, the PLAN started shedding itself of the 
Romeo-class and it is now complete phased out. 16 Ming are still in service, but by most 
estimates the Ming-class is now more or less completely obsolete.
67
 
A sound replacement for the Ming-class is the Song-class that saw the first of class 
commissioned in 1999. The Song-class SSK displaces 2286 tonnes and is roughly the same size 
as the Ming which displaces 2147 tonnes. All around a better submarine than the Ming, and 
armed with anti-ship cruise missiles as compared with the torpedo-only Ming, the Song-class 
SSK can be regarded as part of the natural modernisation step of the Chinese Navy. 
However, if the PLAN’s SSK fleet is to be build up for coastal defence with littoral combat 
submarines, the force posture of H1 predicts a nearly sole focus on fielding small submarines. 
No replacement for a Romeo-size submarine has been commissioned into the Chinese Navy. The 
sinking in March 2010 of the South Korean corvette Cheonan is indicative of how asymmetric 
capabilities can pose a threat to advanced surface ships.
68
 Presumably, the ship was sunk by a 
torpedo fired from a North Korean ‘midget-submarine’ which shows the effectiveness of 
submarines small enough to hide in shallow waters close to the coast where it is harder to detect 
by sonar.
69
 Anti-submarine warfare would be difficult in China’s shallow and noisy littoral 
waters, and small SSKs would be “ideally suited for submarine operations” as they can hide and 
“manoeuvre between the rocks and shoals, where acoustics are clouded.” 70  Additionally, 
numbers matter, and writing in 2004 some two American naval and China analysts warn that the 
U.S. should not dismiss the usefulness of the Romeo and Ming submarines. They could be used 
as bait, fanning out in large numbers and force American SSNs to deal with the older 
submarines, revealing themselves to small number of advanced submarines. “No wonder China 
continue to operate the vessels, which are widely derided as obsolete by Western observers” they 
claim, and state that the PLAN can operate its ageing diesel-electric submarines with great 
tactical efficiency.
71
 Well, not any longer. The Chinese themselves seem to disagree by 
scrapping the Romeos altogether and decommissioning the Mings, albeit at a slower pace. 
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The graph illustrates the point made above. As a share of the tonnage displacement of the entire 
PLAN submarine fleet, the Romeos and Mings was more or less steady until 2005. Seen over the 
entire period of time, the development is striking. In 1997, the two submarines classes displaced 
111529 tonnes compared to the total displacement of 144769, constituting 77% of the entire 
submarine fleet. In 2013, with only the Mings remaining, they displaced 34352 tonnes out of a 
total of 214401 tonnes, only 16%. The Song-class is not included as it is seen as an eventual 
substitute for the Ming-class. If the Song-class is included in calculation the 16 Ming-class and 
16 Song-class SSKs would have a combined displacement 70928 tonnes. Relative to the total 
tonnage of 214401, they still make up only 33% of the entire PLAN submarine in terms of 
tonnage. 
 
Concluding on Conventional Submarines 
 
Over the period of time from 1997-2013 China has build a submarine force geared for a whole 
lot more than more than coastal defence, decreasing the  explanatory power of Hypothesis 1. The 
PLAN fields a submarine fleet that greatly surpasses the limited number and relatively small size 
predicted the defensive realist position sketched out in H1. The nature and implications of 
China’s enlarging fleet of advanced conventional-powered submarines will be discussed in 
following chapters, as they have reached a level of both quantity, quality and size that serves 
better to be analysed within the offensive realist framework of Hypothesis 3. 
 
Patrol and Coastal Combatants 
 
Until the mid-2000s, the PLAN’s force of missile patrol boats were made up of old and basically 
obsolete vessels based on Soviet designs. China has sought to modernise and upgrade its coastal 
and littoral combatants in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. Part of this process has been the 
development of anti-ship missile carrying FACs (fast attack craft) and the gradual 
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decommissioning of older missile and torpedo boats. The PLAN still deploys 11 Huangfen-class 
(Type-021), 6 Houjian-class (Type-037/II), and 20 Houxin-class (Type-037/IG) FACs equipped 
with anti-ship missiles.
72
 But a new and advanced missile craft has made its entrance and has 
attracted much attention, Houbei-class (Type-022). Accordingly, this will be awarded special 
attention in the section below. 
 
The Houbei-class 
 
The programme to deploy domestically produced fast attack craft equipped with advanced 
ASCMs came to fruition in the late 2000s. After extensive trials the first boat was launched in 
2004. Construction of the Houbei-class apparently stopped in 2009, and it is unclear whether 
China will built more.
73
 However, it seems clear that the PLAN has decided that the future of its 
coastal combatants will be centred on this new catamaran-hulled FAC. 
The Houbei-class is an example of how Chinese state-owned civilian companies are used to 
acquire and apply foreign dual-use technology in China’s military build up. The design of the 
ship is based on a commercial fast-ferry of Australian origin. In 1993, Sydney-based AMD 
Marine Consulting, a naval and architectural company, made a joint venture, Seabus 
International Company, with Guangzhou Marine Engineering Company, itself a subsidiary of the 
mammoth China Shipbuilding Company. The joint venture began designing high-speed 
aluminium catamarans, patrol and rescue vessels, and eventually the Chinese Navy adopted the 
design and technology and developed the Houbei.
74
 The wave-piercing catamaran-hull gives the 
Houbei considerably better seakeeping
75
 as it can cruise in rougher seas than mono-hull patrol 
craft of similar size. Combined with the boat’s greater top speed of more than 50 knots, it gives 
the Houbei greater mission flexibility than the older Houku-class, completely phased out by 
2007,
76
 and Haungfen-class boats they are replacing.
77
 The relatively low cost of construction, 
operating and crew-costs allowed the PLAN to rapidly build and deploy the ships. The large 
number of ships that emerged in a relatively short period of time, being build simultaneously in 
at least six different shipyards, also implies that the Houbei-class has been a high priority for the 
PLAN.
78
 
Although the Houbei-class is armed with a Russian six-barrel AK-630 30mm close-in weapon 
system (CIWS) and a FLS-I short range SAM-missile system for self-defence, it is basically an 
ASCM platform. The Houbei is equipped with 8 C-802/YJ-83 (CSS-N-8 Saccade) sea-skimming 
ASCMs with mid-course guidance and active radar homing to 120 km (65 nm) and later versions 
up 180 km (97 nm) at 0.9 Mach, indeed a very potent ASCM.
79
 Other sources claim that the ship 
is packing even greater punching power with the newer-version C-803 ASCM with greater range 
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of up to 135 nm and higher speed.
80
 In any case, the large missile-launch houses at the stern of 
the ship indicate that the Houbei could fire different types of missiles.
81
 
The Houbei-class is well adapted to achieve for coastal defence of China’s littoral and to some 
extent beyond the coastal waters, much more so than China’s previous patrol boats. The now 
mostly obsolete Huangfen-class FACs are of too short range, vulnerable because of their large 
electronic signatures to adequately fulfil such missions. The Houbei is well suited for the 
purpose of single-role ships operating in groups and performing attacks from multiple directions. 
 
Number of units Patrol and Coastal Combatants, 1997-2013: 
 
Patrol and Coastal Combatants, units: The total number of units is patrol and coastal combatants, 
excluding inshore and riverine patrol boats, like the Shanghai-class and Haizhui-class that weigh 
less than a 100 tonnes. Large numbers of these small craft have either been assigned to paramilitary 
forces such as the People’s Armed Police, border guards, or Custom Service, or simply broken up or 
stored.
82
 For comparative reasons, they have therefore been excluded this here. 
 
The graph shows the development of the number of patrol and coastal combatants. The PLAN 
had 150 torpedo boats in service in 1997, three years later only 16 remained, and they had 
entirely been taken out of service in 2006. The coastal patrol craft with ASW mortars saw a 25% 
reduction from 100 to 75 over the time period 1997-2013. 
The number of guided-missile fast attack were more than halved from 188 missile craft 1997 to 
92 boats just two years later in 1999 with large numbers of relics from the Soviet Union being 
scrapped. The number of missile craft were sliced again in a single year from 96 in 2005 to 55 in 
2006 a further reduction of 43% in that single year time-span. Then, the numbers of missile start 
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rising again with the advent of the Houbei with a total number of guided-missile FACs reaching 
102 in 2013. 
The total number of patrol-type coastal combatants has gone from 435 to 177 craft, a striking 
reduction in units of 60%. Evidently, China has not concentrated the efforts of its naval 
modernisation process on coastal defence and patrol boats. 
 
Concluding on Patrol and Coastal Combatants 
  
The torpedo boats that China had relied on for decades like the Huchuan-class has disappeared 
altogether, Likewise, the ancient Soviet-designed Huangfen-class missile crafts have gradually 
been decommissioned with only 11 remaining in service. It is also evident, that the weak ASW 
capabilities of PLAN coastal combatants have not been upgraded. China has not deployed any 
new class of ASW-capable patrol boats in the time period that has been investigated. The anti-
submarine deficiency has been an area of particular weakness of in the Chinese Navy. The still 
only moderate ASW capability of the PLAN is increasingly being handled by frigates, 
helicopters and marine patrol aircraft.
83
 ASW-operations are clearly no longer the role played by 
“submarine chaser” patrol craft as China did in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In whole, the development is clear. The trend is not going towards a large coastal defence force; 
it is going decidedly in the opposite direction. As has been analysed in detail above, the Houbei 
is a modern and highly capable patrol craft. It is fast, it carries advanced ASCMs designed 
engage medium to large surface ships, and it has been deployed in large numbers. The near-
littoral strength of the PLAN has been upgraded and strengthened by the advent of the Houbei-
class. However, the graphical representation of the evolution of the PLAN’s patrol and coastal 
combatants above shows an unmistakable trend of decreasing emphasis on China’s coastal 
defence. 
 
V: Balancing the Hegemon and Its Regional Allies    
- testing H2 
 
 
 
Predicted Posture: 
 
 Larger coastal combatants such as corvette-sized ships that can check an opponent further 
from the Chinese coast to augment the guided-missile fast attack craft deemed enough for 
strictly littoral combat. 
 Surface vessels suitable for autonomous deployment that can meet a potential enemy 
relatively far off the Chinese coast, as opposed to integrated units with each ship assigned 
a specific purpose in the group. Guided missile destroyers (DDG) and guided missile 
frigates (FFG) with expected capabilities including layered anti-air defence systems to 
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defend themselves against aircraft and anti-ship missiles. In addition, anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) capabilities with at least two different kinds of sonar systems, one hull-
mounted, another buoy-based (towed-array) and perhaps assisted by helicopter-borne 
sonar for some kind of triangulation. Shore-based assistance cannot be guaranteed thus 
necessitating independent defensive systems. 
 Increase in numbers of conventional-powered submarines of small to medium size, 
roughly around 2000 tonnes. China’s older submarines are likely to be replaced by more 
modern classes, armed not only with torpedoes but also with anti-ship missiles to deter 
enemy forces from venturing close to the Chinese littoral. 
 Deployment of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). An ASBM deterrence would be a 
unique Chinese capability and if operational would constitute an obstacle for U.S. 
carriers to operate strike groups from within the first island chain. 
Geographical extension: Roughly to the limit of China’s exclusive economic zone, about 200 
nautical miles (nm) from the Chinese coast, to be able to check an opponent well before they 
reach Chinese coastal waters.  
 
Balancing the Hegemon and Regional Powers 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts China to engage in more vigorous balancing behaviour. As mentioned 
earlier, the U.S. strategic pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region is out of necessity. China’s 
growing military might beckon to be balanced, but perhaps from a Chinese point of view, the 
necessity of balancing is the other way around. Two diagrams say it all: 
 
Figure 1 Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
After the end of the Cold War, American defence spending fell sharply, but started rising again 
around the turn of the millennium. After the terror attacks on the U.S. the 11 September 2001 
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and the ensuing Global War On Terror, the U.S. defence budget has risen to the same level as it 
was at the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, even disregarding the contingency funding for 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
 
Figure 2 Source: SIPRI 
Figure 2 shows that the U.S. defence budget is higher than the combined defence spending of the 
13 countries that spends the most on defence after the United States.  Such a marked gap 
between number one and the rest compel other countries to append more on defence themselves. 
In short, China’s growing defence budgets is an expression of balancing against the U.S. and its 
allies in Northeast Asia in order to retain its position in the balance of power in the region. 
As we have seen from the analysis of Hypothesis 1, China has modernised and upgraded its 
littoral and coastal defence forces, but not in a way that could meaningfully be accounted for by 
the predicted posture of H1. Still building on defensive realism, H2 envisions China balancing 
the growth of naval forces in the region by stepping up its game, moving from a pure coastal 
defence posture to a navy capable of checking an enemy force further from Chinese shores. Even 
though H2 pictures China as status quo-oriented and not seeking to overturn the balance of 
power in the region, it will try to keep its position. After all, meeting an opponent on somewhat 
equal footing in the middle of South or East China Sea is to be preferred over engaging a 
potential invasion force in the littoral. As such, H2 is reminiscent of Waltz’s advice to the 
prudent statesman of seeking ‘an appropriate amount of power.’ 
Let us now investigate the predicted force posture of such balancing behaviour. 
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Larger Coastal Combatants 
 
H2 envisage China to deploy larger coastal combatants somewhere between its patrol and fast 
attack craft, and frigates in terms of tonnage displacement. Until now, the PLAN has not 
deployed any such surface combatants. However, it soon will. A programme for a corvette-size 
ship is in progress, the Jiangdao-class Type-056. The vessel has been called a “next generation 
stealth frigate” by Chinese media.84 Here, it shall be labelled a corvette because of its size and 
displacement (1500 tonnes).
85
 The Type-056 is similar to the Pattani-class offshore patrol vessel 
that China built and sold to Thailand in 2005 and 2006.
86
 As might be expected, not much 
technical information on such a new vessel is available, and consequently this section makes use 
of media reports regarding the Type-056 and should therefore taken as exploratory observations. 
Yet, the Type-056 corvette is mentioned in reports for the U.S. Congress and by IHS Jane’s 
which lend some credibility to the specifications given here. 
The lead ship of the new class was laid down in 2010, launched in 2012, and commissioned on 
25 February 2013. At least 10 additional ships have been launched and 18-20 ships of the class 
are expected.
87
 One analyst mentions as many as 30 vessels likely to be procured,
88
another up to 
three dozen.
89
 The ship is being built at an impressive rate at four different shipyards 
simultaneously, further indicating that large quantities are indeed in the offing and expected to be 
commissioned fast, with the additional 10 units expected to be commissioned in 2013-2014.
90
 As 
for weapons, the Jiangdao-class features a 76 mm main gun as well as two 30 mm CIWS, an 8 
cell HQ-10/FL-3000 short-range SAM system and most likely YJ-83 ASCMs. It has a helicopter 
deck, but no hangar. The sensor suite includes fire-control radar, surface-search perhaps for the 
helicopter, and targeting radar for the SSMs. There are also features in the design that indicates 
that towed array sonar can be fitted.
91
 Likely missions for the Type-056 include naval base 
defence, coastal patrol, and escorting. In addition, it has been suggested that torpedo tubes will 
also be fitted or perhaps RDC anti-submarine rocket launchers, although this information seems 
to be speculative.
92
 
The Jiangdao-class corvette could replace the ageing Jianghu-class frigates and Houxin-class 
guided-missile FACs. If that is to be the case, then at least the 30 units mentioned would be 
necessary, but that would mean a marked upgrade with a multipurpose ships being able to 
conduct ASW-missions, patrolling, and base defence missions. On the other hand, it could also 
seem likely that the Type-056 will come in single-purpose variants, with some dedicated to 
ASW- missions and others to surface combat. Compared to larger surface combatants, the 
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Jiangdao-class possesses relatively modern weaponry, but it does seem well suited as a patrol 
vessel dealing with China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It can surely outgun what 
most other rivals could muster in this area. The atrophied navy of The Philippines surely is no 
match, and neither Vietnam has much to show with regards to surface combatants. 
Concluding on the meaning and implications on the arrival of this new corvette in the PLAN 
inventory is speculative, since only one boat has been commissioned, although at least 10 more 
are in build and expected  rather soon. But as an add-on to the more than 60 Houbei-class FACs, 
the Jiangdao-class corvette is a good guess on how China could have a fleet of coastal and patrol 
combat ships to be more assertive in the Chinese littoral and to some extent even farther from 
Chinese shores. But as mentioned, China’s new corvette-sized patrol boat is probably a substitute 
for the aged Jainghu-class frigates and Houxin-class missile FACs. As such, the Jiangdao is 
more accurately regarded as upgrading and modernising existing capabilities, not an indicator of 
a tendency in the Chinese Navy as a whole to attain a defensive coastal posture. 
 
Large Surface Combatants Suitable for Autonomous Deployment 
 
For the Chinese Navy to meet and engage enemy ships in open sea relatively far away from the 
coast, it must be able to deploy large surface ships that can take care of themselves. Operating in 
fairly small numbers and not forming part of a battle group, such vessels must field a wide range 
of both offensive and defensive weapons and as well as sensors. At least since the Second World 
War, it has been clear to all naval strategists that one of the greatest threats to large surface 
warships comes from above.
93
 In the Falkland Wars in 1982 the Argentineans used the French 
Exocet  AShM launched by aircraft to sink the British HMS Sheffield, and Argentine Seahawk 
aircraft bombing and sinking of the British destroyer HMS Coventry.
 94
 These are other historical 
examples of the importance of air attacks on large surface ships operating independently of 
friendly air cover. In present times, the death from above is dealt out in numerous ways, from 
maritime strike aircraft, guided anti-ship missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles launched both 
from aircraft, submarines and other surface combatants. Hence, modern day area air defence 
destroyers and frigates intended for autonomous deployment need layered air defences. 
Layered air defence consists of a ship-launched long-range SAM missile system, a second short-
range SAM system and as a last line of defence a close-in-weapon system (CIWS), a Gatling-
type rapid rate-of-fire gun for shooting down incoming missiles in its terminal phase.
95
 This 
naturally requires air search and fire-control radars for targeting of the SAMs. The development 
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of more and more advanced ASCMs that is faster and stealthier, with improved homing, 
navigation and guidance, as well as better evasive manoeuvrability in its terminal approach has 
made some doubt the continued usefulness of a gun-based CIWS. Several manufacturers are 
developing missile-based systems as the inner-most layer of defence against sea-skimming 
ASCMs.
96
 
Autonomously deployed combatants also need protection against attacks from below and need 
anti-submarine warfare capabilities. This entails torpedoes and ASW mortars, as well as the 
sensors to detect submarines, hence the need for several sonar systems. Bow-mounted sonar 
augmented by towed-array sonar, and ideally complemented by helicopter-borne sonar. The 
helicopter would also carry ASW weapons to engage en enemy submarine. 
Lastly, autonomously deployed surface combatants should, of course, also be capable of fighting 
other surface ships. Certainly its main guns are for this purpose, but more importantly it needs to 
be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). This necessitates adequate radar systems for 
surface search radar in tandem with the fire-control radar mentioned above. 
In the 1970s, the first-generation Luda-class (Type-051) guided-missile destroyers (DDG) and 
Jianghu-class (Type-053) guided-missile frigates (FFG) of Chinese indigenous design were built 
and deployed by the PLAN.
97
 The first of class Luda DDG was commissioned in 1971 and the 
last, the Luda III-class (Type-051G) variant in 1991.
98
 In all 10 ships of the different versions of 
the Luda-class and 12 different Jianghu-class frigates are still in service, but they are very much 
yesterday’s principal  surface combatants. 
 
Towards a Modern Surface Fleet 
 
China’s surface fleet has been vastly expanded both in quantity and quality in the last decade and 
“the PLA(N) surface force is now one of the largest in the world, and its capabilities are growing 
at a remarkable rate”, according to a report from the American Office of Naval Intelligence from 
2009.
99
 This trend has only accelerated since then, with the commissioning of nine additional 
Jiangkai II frigates a third Luyang II-class destroyer,
100
 as well as launching two Luyang III-class 
destroyers expected to be commissioned in 2013.
101
 
The following section features a lot of highly technical data on China’s modern destroyer fleet, 
in order to analyse the progressive development of capabilities in detail. A ‘standard bean count’ 
of adding up numbers of units and standard will not suffice to adequately test the predicted 
posture in the H2. The frigates will not be examined in such detail. 
 
                                                          
96
 Scott, Richard, The Last Line of Defence, Jane’s Navy International, 12 February 2002. 
97
 Nan Li,The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ”Near Coast” and ”Near Seas” to ”Far 
Seas”; Asian Security, vol. 5, no. 2, 2009, p. 
98
 See Appendix XXX. 
99
 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, People’s Liberation Army Navy, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, 
August 2009. p. 21; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, People’s Liberation Army Navy, A Modern Navy with Chinese 
Characteristics, August 2009, p. 18. 
100
 See Appendix XXX for details on the development of principal surface combatants in the PLAN inventory. 
101
 IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships, Destroyers, Luyang III (Type-052D), 11 March 2013. 
38 
 
 
 
 
Sovremenny-class 
 
In 1996 China ordered two Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia, and they were 
commissioned into service in 1995 and 1996 respectively. 2002 saw the order of an additional 
two Sovremenny-class destroyers. They remain the biggest surface combatants in the in the 
PLAN inventory, each displacing 8067 tonnes, and they are ships of quite impressive 
capabilities, especially its ASCMs which has been noted.
102
 The Sovremenny-class is fitted with 
ASW mortars and torpedoes and requisite hull-mounted sonar augmented by ASW helicopters, 
either one Russian Kamov Ka-28 Helix or the 1 Harbin Zhi-9C Haitun of domestic Chinese 
design. Its layered air defence is comprised of an outer SAM layer of the 2 SA-N-7 
Gadfly/Uragan with 44 missiles in all, and homing up to 25 km and an altitude range of 15-14 
km. The second SAM layer is the 8 SA-N-11 (Grisson), and finally AK630 Gatling-gun CIWS. 
This is bound together with numerous radar systems for air and surface and fire-control radars.
103
 
In short, the Sovremennys provide good air defence. According to the report from the Office of 
Naval Intelligence the sophisticated air surveillance systems such as Russian Top Plate radar can 
be linked with SAM systems and radars such as the Chinese-made Dragon Eye phased-array 
enabling the ships to provide are air defence.
104
 
That being said, the Sovremennys are mostly for surface combat and as mentioned above, it is in 
this are that their most potent punch is. All four destroyers carry 8 of the Russian-made Raduga 
SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. This very highly capable ASCM flies at 
Mach 3 and accelerates to Mach 4,5 in the attack phase. On the first two Sovremenny-class 
delivered to China the Sunburn had a range of 160 km, but on the next two destroyers, an 
upgraded version reaching as long as 240 km was installed.
105
 
 
The Luyang-class 
 
The Luyang-class destroyers are modern area-air defence multirole destroyers capable of 
autonomous deployment far away from the Chinese coast. Naturally, the Luyang II (Type-052C) 
represents a significant improvement compared to the initial design, and the newly launched 
Luyang III-class yet another upgrade of China’s destroyer fleet. 
Luyang I (Type-052B) 
This is China’s first indigenously designed attempt at a true blue-water multirole guided missile 
destroyer. The two Luyang I-class ships equipped with 16 C-802 (YJ-83/CSS-N-8 Saccade) 
ASCMs with a 120 km range, 6 light weight torpedoes and 100mm calibre guns. It has medium-
range layered air defence with SA-N-12 Grizzly SAMs (48 missiles) with radar and infra red (IR) 
homing up to 35 km, and a Type-730A close in weapon system (CIWS). It also features a hangar 
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with capacity for one naval combat helicopter, either a Harbin Zhi-9A Haitun or Kamov KA-28 
Helix that augments anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
106
 
Luyang II (Type052C) 
The Luyang II represents a substantial upgrade compared with the former, on almost all fronts. It 
incorporates stealth features and has C-602 (YJ-62) ASCMs with increased range of up to 280 
km with inertial-GPS guidance and terminal active radar homing. Most significantly though, are 
the vastly improved area air defence capabilities. The Luyang II features the Dragon Eye (Type-
346) phased-array air search/fire-control radar and the HHQ-9 VLS SAM. The Dragon Eye radar 
is comparable to the similar to the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system,107 and HHQ-9 SAMs are designed 
to be effectively counter high-performance cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles anti-ship 
missiles and aircraft with a range of up to 100 km flying at Mach 3. Little more is known about 
the system, but it is reported to be able to track 100 targets and engage 50 targets simultaneously 
(though the Luyang II only packs 48 missiles).
108
 In addition, the ship’s hangar facilities have 
been enlarged to have capacity for 2 helicopters further improving the destroyers surface and 
anti-submarine capabilities.
109
 
Luyang III (Type-052D) 
The first two ships of this new class of destroyers were seen under construction in 2012 at 
Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai. They were laid down in 2010 and then launched for sea trials in 
August 2012 and expected to be commissioned in 2013. Unsurprisingly, much of the information 
on this new ship is speculative, but it appears that the ship has bigger main gun of 130 mm as 
compared to the 100 mm gun featured in the previous Luyang-designs. Most noteworthy of the 
new class is an improvement of Dragon Eye phased-array radar in combination with new VLS 
system capable of launching surface-to-surface and anti-submarine missiles. In addition, the 
HHQ-9 features 64 as compared to 48 SAMs, and the air defence capabilities is improved by a 
FL-3000N short-range SAM system. Moreover, some observers has suggested that a change to 
the vertical launch systems might mean that the Luyang III-class could incorporate a naval 
version of the DH-10 land-attack cruise missile. A total of 10 ships are suggested as plausible, 
but this will surely take time before such numbers are commissioned into the PLAN, as lengthy 
trials of the new class are expected in line with the track record of testing and assessments 
portrayed above.
110
 
 
Trial-and-Error Development 
 
Alongside the purchase of the four Sovremenny-class destroyers from, China has developed and 
deployed 10 new classes of destroyers and frigates. Some of these are variations of one another, 
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suggesting that the PLAN is building a few in each class in a trial-and-error approach to make 
use of learning experiences before moving to mass production. 
This certainly seems to be the case with the Jiangwei I (Type-053H2G) and Jiangwei II (Type-
053H3). The former was laid down, launched and commissioned in the first half of the 1990s 
and only four ships were built. The Jiangwei II-class was laid down and launched in the second 
half of the 1990s and into the early 2000s, with 10 ships of the improved design now in 
service.
111
 The Jiangwei II has better air defences with improved Surface-to-Air missile (SAM) 
system and refitting of the anti-air guns, and an upgraded fire-control system.
112
 
The same developmental pattern is even more striking regarding the Jiangkai-class frigates. The 
first of the only two Jiangkai I (Type-054) ships was laid down in 2001, launched in 2003, and 
commissioned in 2005. Also in 2005, the first of the Jiangkai II-class (Type-054A) was laid 
down and mass production soon commenced in multiple ships yards. In only five years, the 
PLAN has commissioned 13 Jiangkai II frigates with 7 more in construction and thus 
comprising a batch of 20 ships of the class.
113
 
The Luyang I-class and Luyang II-class destroyers have undergone a similar model of progress 
with two of the former being laid down in 2001, launched in 2002, and commissioned in 2004. 
The latter design followed quite quickly hereafter, with the first of class laid down in 2002, 
launched in 2003 and also commissioned in 2004, the second was commissioned in 2005.
114
 The 
Luyang I was in turn based on the Luhai-class design of which a single vessel was 
commissioned.
115
 This was followed by a break of about four years before construction of the 
third vessel began, corroborating China’s careful evaluation of a new class. The testing involved 
the Dragon Eye (Type-346) phased-array air search/fire-control radar and the HHQ-9 vertical 
launch system (VLS) for surface-to-air missiles (SAM).
116
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The graph above shows the aggregate tonnage of the entire fleet of principal surface combatants 
and modern surface combatants. The term ‘modern’ includes the Jiangwei-class I and II frigates, 
the Jiangkai-class I and II frigates, the Sovremenny-class destroyers, the Luzhou-class destroyers 
and the Luyang I and II. It does not include the Luyang III-class as it has not been commissioned 
into service yet. ‘Modern’ is defined both as the year of build, i.e. how old the designs are, but 
also on the basis of whether the ships can deemed fit for autonomous deployment, i.e. that they 
have adequate air defence systems and a hangar with the capacity to bring a helicopter, in most 
cases for ASW-purposes. As such, they appear in the appendix A with the abbreviation DDGHM 
for the destroyers and FFGHM for the frigates.
117
 
The tendency decipherable from the graph is clear. In terms of overall tonnage displacement the 
PLAN fleet of principal surface combatants has almost doubled in size. The total tonnage has 
increased from 130101 tonnes in 1997 to 247916 in 2013, a growth of 90%. This is in itself a 
remarkable number that speaks volumes of the substantial growth in Chinese naval power. In 
terms of modernization of the fleet, from old and relatively inept ships the growth is just is truly 
breathtaking. In 1997, the Chinese could muster four of the Jiangwei I-class frigates with a 
displacement of 9144 tonnes. In 2013 the tonnage displacement of modern destroyers and 
frigates is 167396, a mindboggling increase of 1730% in tonnage. This is not a typo. The 
PLAN’s inventory of modern surface combatants capable of autonomous deployment as defined 
above has increased 1730% since the Taiwan Strait Crisis.  
The sheer scale of these numbers makes it very hard to see the development and modernization 
of the Chinese fleet of destroyers and frigates as status quo-motivated balancing behaviour as 
predicted in H2. The behaviour of China in this area must be one of the most striking examples 
of power-maximising behaviour. 
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Conventional-Powered Attack Submarines 
 
The argument raised concerning the growth in quality and quantity of PLAN’s SSK submarine 
fleet vis-à-vis the requirements for fulfilling Hypothesis 1 must be repeated here. H2 does 
envision a larger number of conventional submarines in order to balance against increasing naval 
power of the countries in the region. In combination with the modern destroyers and frigates 
discussed above, a more robust underwater fighting force would have a greater deterrent effect 
on the U.S. Navy as well as the navies of Japan and South Korea. If push did come to shove, for 
example in the unlikely but not implausible event of Taiwan declaring independence and a 
conflict would escalate to the use of force or even war, China would surely stand a better chance 
with a more submarine forces. But, as argued in H1 so is the case regarding the submarine 
posture predicted in H2. China has moved past the point of status quo-seeking balancing 
behaviour in its determined efforts to deploy a much more submarine force. Arguably, either a 
successful Song-class programme or the 12 Kilo-class SSKs armed with ASCMs would suffice 
from a balancing point of view. The two series moving ahead in unison and the development of 
the Yuan-class more than hints at submarine force deployed for a more strategically offensive 
purpose. The actual submarine force deployed by the PLAN now will be examined closely in the 
following chapter on Hypothesis 3. 
 
The Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
 
The possibility of the development of an Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) by China has 
understandably attracted a great deal of attention, especially in the United States, and it has been 
mentioned in numerous American governmental reports.
118
 
There is little doubt that the ASBM is based on the DH-21. This is a tried and tested missile in 
the Chinese inventory.
119
 However, the ASBM has long been discussed, and it has probably 
reached initial operational capability, but whether it could actually hit a moving carrier at sea is 
unknown. Sometimes the talk of the coming of the Chinese ASBM has reached hyperbole 
heights. Already in 2005, the Pentagon learned that Chinese engineers were working on an 
ASBM project. According to a retired American rear-admiral the thought of a ballistic missile 
able to target U.S. aircraft carriers had some of his colleagues “running around with their hair on 
fire.”120 
A Chinese ASBM would surely be intended for use against U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, and if 
operational it would have serious implications for American operations within the first island 
chain. As such, an ASBM would have a significant deterrent quality with the capability to strike 
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moving aircraft carriers at sea. Together with the several platforms from which the PLAN can 
deliver ASCMs it is not unthinkable that China could saturate American Aegis area air defences 
and the point defence systems of the carriers themselves. But the ASBM alone is probably is not 
the game-changer some have made it to be for a number of reasons.
121
 
A ballistic missile launched 1500-2000 km away would take around 12-13 minutes to reach its 
target, and would need to make corrections to its trajectory in the last 20-30 seconds. An aircraft 
carrier can move approximately 300-350 m in 20-30 seconds, as it would be aware that the 
missile is approaching.
122
 Furthermore, an ASBM would be a “system of systems” with 
numerous problems that China most likely have not yet solved, not the least sufficient numbers 
of advanced satellites for space-based targeting.
123
 
In sum, the advent of the ASBM would surely provide China an extra deterrence for the U.S. 
Navy to consider, and it might effectively make American carrier operations close to Chinese 
waters more difficult. But the ASBM, if it is demonstrably working and deployed does not seem 
to be such a game-changing carrier-killer missile as it might seem at first look. 
 
Concluding on H2: Balancing the Hegemon and Its Regional Allies   
 
The coastal defence forces considered in H1, especially the Houbei-class (Type-022) FAC armed 
with ASCMs, augmented by the recently commissioned Jiangdao-class (Type-056) corvette and 
the expected numbers in the next couple of years, together with modern frigates and destroyers 
and the advanced submarines more than meets the predicted force posture in H2. This again 
leads to the conclusion, that defensively oriented balancing behaviour is not the end of the line 
for the strategic ambitions of China in the maritime domain. 
The ASBM discussed does seem indeed seem to have a very potent deterrence role to play if it 
becomes operational. There is little doubt that China is labouring hard to make that happen, and 
perhaps it already has, but as discussed there are numerous challenges for China to overcome 
before the ASBM will be the awesome aircraft carrier menace that is sometimes believed. 
The vast massive growth of in the size of the fleet principal surface combatants is of great 
significance. On the one hand, it surely meets the posture predicted in H2, that China would 
build a surface fleet suitable for autonomous deployment. The PLAN’s new frigates and 
destroyers anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities of layered air defences protecting the ships 
themselves are improving, there has been a marked shift to ships that also have hangar capacity 
for an ASW helicopter augmented the hull-mounted sonar systems and generally improving the 
protection from submarine attacks. This all makes the ships able to operate far from Chinese 
coast without air cover from aircraft. More significantly though is the improving capabilities in 
area air defence, so that the destroyers and frigates are not only capable of point defence, i.e. 
themselves, but of providing air cover for large areas where other ships like the Houbei FAC and 
Jiangdao corvette could operate protected from AShM and aircraft. Additionally it would also 
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provide diesel-electric submarines air cover from ASW aircraft, conceivably allowing much 
greater possibility to surface to snorkel depth and recharge batteries As such, the explanatory 
power of H2 is significantly decreased. 
VI: In Pursuit of Regional Dominance - testing 
H3  
Predicted Posture: 
 
 Amphibious assault capabilities to enforce claims on disputed islands such as the 
Diaoyou/Senkaku Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, and the Scarborough 
Shoal. Such amphibious capabilities are operating in groups and do not need to be 
multifunctional vessels suitable for autonomous deployment. 
 Large and advanced submarine force with medium-sized conventional-powered 
submarines (SSK) up to 3000 tonnes, augmented by nuclear-powered attack submarines 
(SSN). China will continue the build up of an imposing underwater fighting force 
equipped with advanced weaponry such as anti-ship cruise missiles. 
 Aircraft carrier programme capable of offering limited power projection capabilities, 
furthering China’s status as a dominant major regional naval force more directed against 
other regional powers and not against the United States. 
Geographical extension: China’s Near Seas - the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South 
China Sea, with an A2AD capability within the first island chain. 
China has for several years now behaved more assertively in staking its territorial claims in the 
East and South China seas, although the other littoral countries would surely be more inclined to 
call China’s behaviour belligerent. China’s clash with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is 
the most serious and potentially most dangerous of the conflicts and maritime disputes in which 
China is engaged. The dispute is old, but is was reignited on 7 September 2010 when a Chinese 
fishing boat allegedly rammed two Japanese coast guard ships near the disputed islands. The 
Chinese captain was arrested and this led to a major diplomatic row between Tokyo and Beijing, 
and China suspended export to Japan of rare earths and minerals, tiny but crucial components in 
Japanese high-tech industry.
124
 Since then, the dispute has turned into an outright confrontation 
between China and Japan that has only worsened, most alarmingly when Japan claimed, that a 
Chinese warship had locked its fire-control radar on a Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force 
destroyer and helicopter in two separate incidents in January 2013.
125
 In April 2013, Japanese 
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Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has vowed to drive out any Chinese landing on the islands by force if 
need be.
126
 
China has continued to bicker with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal. In May 2010, the 
Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs reportedly told a Philippine diplomat in Beijing that 
Manila was “severely damaging the atmosphere of the bilateral relations between China and the 
Philippines.”127 China is also embroiled with Vietnam over the territorial rights over the Paracel 
Islands and the Spratly Islands. Tensions flared between China and Vietnam in 1974 when the 
Vietnamese discovered Chinese troops had occupied the territory and a small naval skirmish 
ensued. The relationship between China and Vietnam deteriorated even further and 1988 saw 
another naval battle over the Spratly Islands that left 70 Vietnamese sailors dead. Vietnam still 
claims the Paracel Islands, but it seems like close to impossible for Vietnam to get them back. 
Recently, China has opened the islands up as a tourist resort and in late April 2013, a cruise ship 
with up to 1000 passengers paid a nifty price of more than US$1100 (7000-9000 yuan) for a 
four-day trip.
128
 
The disputes over miniscule islands and barren reefs are not only about more than taking what is 
rightfully one’s own territory. China claims almost the entire South China Sea, based on ancient 
maps and of sometimes dubious merit. As has so often been the case in international politics and 
territorial disputes it is about resources. The South China is rich in fishing grounds and both the 
East and South China Sea are believed to hold vast untapped oil and gas resources. 
Moving from the defensive realist world of Waltz to the offensive, the third hypothesis takes off 
from predictions of China’s strategic behaviour building on offensive realism as formulated by 
Mearsheimer. Both defensive and offensive realism accept security to as the primary concern for 
states, and recognize that the structural forces in the self-help system of international politics 
compel states to be strong to be secure. As portrayed, a key difference between these two 
variants of structural realism is the question of how much power is enough. 
Hypothesis 3 envisages China to strive for a position of regional dominance. That entails being 
recognised as the top dog in the East and South China Seas, pursuing a strategy of anti access 
area denial strategy within the first island chain and beyond into the Western Pacific. Elements 
of this strategy are clearly directed towards the U.S. Pacific Fleet and especially to counter its 
carrier strike groups. Another component of the pursuit of regional dominance is for China to 
have the naval power to back up its territorial claims in the East China Sea and especially the 
South China Sea. 
Building on the capabilities discussed in the testing H1 and H2 we shall now turn to look at 
predictions for China’s naval posture generated from offensive realism and a resulting strategic 
behaviour designed for China to achieve regional dominance of the maritime domain in its Near 
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Seas. Again, it is important to emphasise that the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but 
layers of strategic scope, military capabilities, and geographical extension. This means, when 
progressing from H2 to H3, we presuppose the naval forces that we have so far concluded China 
to have. Not the naval forces in the predicted postures of the two previous hypotheses, but the 
actual naval forces described and analysed in the previous two chapters. 
The beginning of this chapter summarised the capabilities of H1 and H2. Furthermore, in order 
to achieve the status of dominating the maritime region envisioned in H3 China would need 
additional capabilities, even higher numbers of advanced conventional-powered submarines as 
well as amphibious assault ships. Now, we shall investigate the predicted posture of H3. 
 
Amphibious Capabilities 
 
China’s amphibious forces are focused on short-range amphibious assault missions for a Taiwan 
contingency and to pose  a credible threat of invasion of Taiwan. The PLAN has a 10.000 man 
strong marine brigade, and the PLA Army a much larger force of somewhere between 300-
500.000 men with some degree of amphibious training. These are stationed in five army groups 
on the coast opposite Taiwan. They are equipped with a variety of vehicles and weapons, 
including amphibious tanks and specialised amphibious assault equipment like trucks for 
preparing landings on Taiwan’s expansive mud flats.129 That being said, the focus here is not on 
the PLA Army nor on Taiwan invasion preparedness, but on the amphibious forces China is 
building up to stake for operations further afield. 
As examined in chapter IV and V the hefty numbers of the Houbei-class (Type-022) FAC, the 
soon-to-be commissioned large quantities of the Jiangdao-class (Type-056) corvette, and 
remarkable numbers of Jiangkai II-class (Type-054A) and Jiangwei II-class (Type-053H3) 
FFGHMs, Luyang II-class (Type-052C) the coming Luyang III-class (Type-053D) and the large 
Sovremenny-class DDGHMs are beginning to make up a relatively formidable regional surface 
fleet. Such a fleet, in combination with amphibious assault capabilities constitutes a considerable 
power-projection capability of the PLAN, and with a conceivably much more offensive purpose 
than what has been envisaged by H1 and H2. 
The PLAN’s principal amphibian vessel is the Yuzhao-class (Type-071) Landing Platform Dock 
(LPD) with a displacement of 18,500 tonnes. The existence of the programme was somewhat 
shrouded in mystery, but the veil was raised with the construction of the first of class in 2006. 
Since then, two more ships have been built and a fourth vessel is under construction.
130
 The 
Type-071 addresses the PLANs previous shortcomings in sealift and power projection 
capabilities. With regards to weapons, the Yuzhao is very lightly armed with one 76 mm gun and 
4 30 mm AK630 guns. Obviously, the firepower it comprises is not its quality, but the power it 
can project  is what matters. The LPD has a capacity for four Z-8 Super Frelon helicopters.
131
 It 
can carry a number of vehicles and 500-800 troops.
132
 It can accommodate 4 Utility Craft Air 
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Cushion (UCAC), probably the Jiangsha II-class of which 10 are in service,
133
 or two of the 
bigger Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC).
134
  
 
Concluding on Amphibious Capabilities 
 
China is not amassing an amphibious force to be able to place ground forces in large numbers in 
the invasion of foreign countries. The three and soon to be four amphibious assault LPDs are 
starting to look like something that can be used for regional issues such as settling the territorial 
claims in the South China Sea mentioned in the beginning of the chapter. China could then quite 
easily project its power to the Spratly or Paracels if it came to a conflict with Vietnam. Not 
unconceivable is punitive missions against the Philippine island of Palawan. China occupied the 
Mischeif Reef close to Philippine island of Palawan in 1994, and further production of the Type-
071 LPD surely makes such missions within the reach of the Chinese Navy. 
In sum, the limited power projection capability of an amphibious force predicted in Hypothesis 3 
is if not completely achieved, then at least well in the making. 
 
Diesel-Electric Powered Attack Submarines 
 
A significant capability change is taking place in the area of undersea warfare in the PLAN. 
China has for long been committed to the development of its submarine fleet. It is evident that a 
remarkable transformation towards more, bigger, and better submarines has taken place and that 
the progression has not ended, but is an ongoing process. The build-up of modern and advanced 
conventionally powered attack submarines is one of the most remarkable aspects in the 
modernisation of the Chinese military, and something that has attracted much attention. At the 
same time, China has bought large numbers of modern submarines from Russia while 
developing and deploying even bigger numbers of domestically designed SSKs. 
The most striking example was the unprecedented signing of a contract on the delivery of eight 
new Type 636 Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia in May 2002 equipped with the 
Klub/Sizzler ASCM described in chapter V on Chinese anti-ship missile capabilities. This deal 
was in addition to the four Kilo-submarines that China had already acquired.
135
 Whether out of 
hope or insight, some Western analysts saw the purchase of the Russian submarines as a sign that 
China had significant problems with its own Song-class diesel powered submarines program.
136
 
However, that does not seem to have been the case. The five years passing between the launch of 
the first to two Songs did indicate considerable engineering and design trouble, but with the 
launch of the third and fourth boat with improved design in 2002 suggests that the Song 
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programme is moving ahead in unison with the Kilo purchases.
137
 Indeed, the remarkable 
incidence where a Chinese submarine surfaced within nine miles of the American aircraft carrier 
Kitty Hawk was accomplished by a Song-class submarine.
138
 China has since commissioned 
further three Songs in 2004, another three in 2005 and two in 2006, pointing to a certain degree 
of satisfaction with the programme within the PLAN and Chinese leadership.
139
 The purchase of 
the eight new submarines from Russia does not entail that China is losing faith in its home-build 
design, but they are to work in unison. The PLAN has now deployed no less than 16 Song-class 
SSKs
140
. 
 
The graph shows the increase in PLAN submarine tonnage. It is true that the number of units 
fluctuates around 60-70 boats in the investigated period, some years going up and others down. 
The growth of the combined tonnage of the submarine fleet, however, demonstrates the 
expansion of the fleet in terms of size of the boats. In 1997, the submarine fleet displaced 
144,768 tonnes, and in 2013 it had risen to 222,989, an increase of 54 %. 
In addition to the purchase of the Kilos and development of the Song, China produced a third 
advanced SSK, the Yuan-class. The Yuan is bigger than the Song displacing more than 3000 
tonnes as compared to the Song’s 2286. The submerged displacement of the Yuan-class could not 
be obtained, but with a surfaced displacement of 2900 tonnes it is most surely of comparable size 
with the Kilo-class that displaces 3125 tonnes.
141
 As such, it can be considered ocean going. 
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Number of conventional-powered attack-submarines, 1997-2013: 
 
 
The graph above shows the aggregate number of units and the development in over time.
142
 The 
total number of conventional-powered attack-submarines has remained virtually at the same 
level, with 53 submarines in 1997, 61 for the first of 2000s and going down again to 56 in 2013. 
In 1997, only 4 of the 53 submarines could be characterised as modern, 3 Kilo-class and 1 Song-
class, the rest of the fleet consisting of the antiquated Romeo-class built in the early 1960s and 
the Chinese Ming-class version built from the same platform, the first of which was 
commissioned in 1971. In 2013 however, the picture is completely reversed. Only 16 Ming 
remain and by now, the PLAN has commissioned 40 modern and relatively big conventional 
attack submarines capable of firing advanced anti-ship cruise missiles. 
The PLAN submarine fleet has taken decisively more offensive posture since the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis in 1996, with two domestically produced programmes, the Song and Yuan. As mentioned 
in analysis of Hypothesis 1 the 16 medium-sized (displacing 2286 tonnes) submarines of the 
Song-class alone would be a replacement for the Ming-class. However, the big AIP-equipped 
Yuan-class, displacing more than 3000 tonnes when submerged, is an ocean-going submarine 
surely not designed for operations in the shallow Chinese coastal waters. As the Song, the Yuan-
class carries the YJ-82 ASCM and quite possibly wake-homing torpedoes. No less than 12 
submarines of the class have been commissioned between 2006 and 2012. In tandem with this 
quite impressive build up is the procurement of the 12 Kilo-class, Russia’s top-of-the-line diesel-
electric submarine. The very stealthy Kilo submarine’s long-range supersonic Sizzler ASCM   
very likely the super-cavitating Shkval torpedo gives the PLAN SSK fleet a formidable offensive 
punch capability. 
  
                                                          
142
 Graph produced from the numbers in Appendix XX, excluding the submarines that serve as test platforms. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
Total
Kilo, Song & Yuan
Romeo & Ming
50 
 
 
 
 
Concluding on Diesel-Electric Powered Attack Submarine 
 
The trend towards building a fleet of fairly big SSKs is remarkably obvious and corresponds 
very well with the predictions made in Hypothesis 3. The large numbers in the PLAN inventory 
of modern SSKs anti-ship cruise missiles and advanced torpedoes constitute a key part of 
China’s concerted effort in acquiring anti-access/area denial to deter or deny the American 
Pacific Fleet, freedom of movement within first island chain and into the waters beyond. This 
entails jeopardizing U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups operating out of their military bases in 
Japan and South Korea and eventually Guam with the goal of making American power 
projection and intervention riskier and more costly. 
The Chinese SSK fleet is certainly an overwhelming force in the South China Sea relative to 
naval power of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam that are all claiming part of the sea 
conflicting with China’s to it almost all of it.143 
 
Aircraft carrier 
 
In the first half of the first decade in the 21
st
 century many scholars and analysts were of the 
persuasion that China was not going to have a go at fielding aircraft carriers, let alone 
restructuring the PLAN to be carrier-centric not the least because of the immense costs 
involved.
144
 
However, they have been proven at least halfway wrong. On 10 August 2011, the Lioaning 
began sea trial in the north Yellow Sea, making into reality what had been a Chinese desire for 
80 years. Echoing the the introduction of China’s first SSBN, major General Lou Yuan stated 
that “well begun is have done... the effect of having something is completely different from 
having nothing.”145 Originally bought under the excuse of turning it into a floating casino the 
Ukrainian- bought ex-Varyag was never filled with blackjack tables and slot machines, but with 
radars and weapon systems “There would be no gambling with this strategic opportunity.146” 
Although many has stressed the significance of China’s first aircraft carrier, the strategic 
consequences in the near-term future are perhaps not game-changing. It could surely not hold its 
own against the U.S. Navy and it is not intended for use against the Americans. Indeed, Chinese 
naval analysts readily admit that their new pride would be very short-lived if it was deployed 
against the superior forces of the U.S. Navy. The Chinese carrier does however have major 
strategic impact for smaller powers in the region. It represents a limited power-projection 
capability, but together with the rest of the surface fleet discussed above, it could surely provide 
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sustained air cover and be a platform for fighter aircraft that could for either maritime or land 
strikes. 
As such, together with the amphibious forces analysed above, and operating together with 
China’s new modern surface fleet and increasingly potent conventional submarines, a single 
aircraft carrier could further tip the balance of power in the South China Sea, making countries 
like the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam think twice before standing up to China. Likewise, 
the Liaoning could surely make China make more decisively and uncompromisingly in the 
maritime disputes i the South China Sea. But, the Liaoning is probably not suitable for use 
outside China’s region and certainly not if the United States would be likely to use force. 
 
VII: Extra-Regional  Ambitions - testing H4 
 
 
Predicted Posture: 
 
 China wants to be a significant sea power in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. 
China will continue to deploy long-range ocean going surface vessels suitable for 
autonomous deployment such as with such as multifunctional destroyers and frigates with 
layered air defence and sophisticated radar, sonar, and weapons systems. 
 Replenishment at sea (RAS) vessels and other support vessels intended to enable 
continuous deployment far off Chinese shores, indeed in distant regions. 
 China will invest heavily in large ocean going submarines. Big nuclear powered attack 
submarines (SSN) are a major constituent. Nuclear ballistic submarines carrying nuclear 
nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) will increase in number and 
ensure China a credible second strike capability and first-rate deterrence capability. 
 China will also pursue its aircraft carrier ambitions with great vigour. China will launch 
more aircraft carriers in the years to come, and build the support vessels needed to form 
carrier strike groups that will constitute major power projection capabilities. This is of 
course coupled with expansion in numbers and quality of naval aviation units. 
Geographical extension: The high seas, including the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean 
Region. 
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China in the Indian Ocean Region 
 
In 1405, Admiral Zheng He embarked on a voyage to lead a massive fleet of huge war junks that 
set out to visit the Western countries as the envoy of Emperor Zhu Di (1360-1424) of the Ming 
Dynasty. Through the next 28 years, Zheng He conducted seven voyages through South East 
Asia, the Indian Ocean and into the Red Sea, reaching as far as the coast of Africa, and the 
expeditions opened up opportunities for trade and cultural exchanges. But perhaps more 
importantly, the journeys was to display the Ming Dynasty’s might and reach.147 By 1420, the 
Imperial Chinese Navy was probably the largest in the world, and the fleet commanded by 
Zheng He is likely to have out-weighed, out-gunned, and out-classed anything that European 
naval forces could muster. With the death of Zhu Di, a new emperor succeeded to the throne 
shunning the world overseas, scrapped the navy, and withdrew China from the high seas. Thus, 
Chinese merchant ships were at the mercy of Indonesian, Japanese, and Vietnamese pirates, and 
left the Indian Ocean and water ways to East Asia open to the European colonial powers of 
Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The disappearance of the Ming Dynasty navy enabled the 
European to roam unchecked and ushered in the decline of China as a naval power, and 
ultimately led to the exploitation of China heralded by the colonial powers and the interventions 
of Germany, Britain, Japan, and Russia in the 20
th
.
148
 Six centuries later, Chinese war ships are 
once again venturing into the Indian Ocean. 
 
China and India, Asian Elephants Trumpeting at Sea 
 
Usually, elephants don’t go swimming in the ocean and are naturally not very fond of salt water, 
but on the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean, elephants are known to 
take to the sea.
149
 Now, other kinds of traditionally land-based giants are taking to the ocean. 
In 2009, Chinese two Luyang II-class destroyers traversing the Indian Ocean on their way to 
participate in the anti-piracy missions off the Somali coast played a game of cat and mouse with 
an Indian Kilo-class submarine, reportedly probing each other´s sonar weaknesses, involving the 
Chinese destroyers to scramble its ASW helicopters and allegedly ordering the helicopters to arm 
its anti-submarine torpedoes.
150
 Chinese media reports said that the Chinese warship forced the 
Indian submarine to the surface, but this was vehemently denied by the Indian Navy.
151
 In July 
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2011, the roles were reversed when a Chinese warship intercepted the Indian Navy INS Airavat 
amphibious assault ship. The PLAN ship asked the Indian vessel identify itself and explain what 
it was doing in the South China Sea after leaving Vietnamese waters, after having made a 
scheduled port call.
152
 
As China rises to become a major global power its military footprint will increasingly be felt 
around the world around the world. China´s navy has for a while made a thrust into the Indian 
Ocean and is building strategic partnerships with littoral countries of the IOR. Naturally, much 
of China´s the strategic manoeuvring is concerning India, and the two are jockeying for strategic 
depth and influence in “each other´s” seas. The steps China is taking to enhance its interests in 
the Indian Ocean has apprehended security and strategic circles in India, fueling a common 
security competition pattern in the IOR. To a large extent, it is China´s naval power and thrust 
into the Indian Ocean that is fuelling Indian naval posturing.
153
 Tensions have been mounting 
between the two powers and several episodes have seen the India and China facing off at sea. 
 
Nuclear-powered Submarines 
 
In order to be a true blue-water navy and project power over long distances, H4 envisions China 
to invest massively in nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). The advantage of SSNs over 
conventional-powered submarines is mainly the vastly superior endurance. Nuclear-powered 
submarines can remain submerged for much longer periods of time since they do not have to 
surface to recharge batteries, and they are able to attain higher underwater speed.
154
 Additionally 
they should have superior overall stealth capability because of the long submerged cruise range. 
However, generally speaking conventional-powered submarines are quieter when running on 
batteries than SSNs which tend to make more machine noise.
155
 The engineering challenge of 
SSNs is daunting, and nuclear-powered submarines are also vastly more expensive.  
The PLAN’s first SSN was the Han-class (Type-091), a relatively small SSN displacing 5639 
tonnes commissioned in 1984. More Han-class followed and eventually China deployed five of 
the class. However, two have been decommissioned and now the PLAN only has three Han-class 
SSNs in service.
156
 China’s next-generation SSN, the Shang-class (Type-093) was laid down in 
1994, but it took a whole of 12 years before it commissioned into service in 2006. A second boat 
followed the year after and two additional vessels are in build.
157
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Figur 3 Relative noise levels of nuclear submarines. Source: U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009 
The graphical representation above is from the report by U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence from 
2009 mentioned earlier and it clearly shows the Chinese submarines lagging far behind in 
perhaps the most important asset of a submarine, its stealth, and consequent risk of being 
detected. 
The nuclear-powered submarine force of China can be seen as a bellwether on China’s strategic 
behaviour with regards to power projection capabilities and naval policies in general.
158
 The 
desire to field both SSBN and SSNs is clearly there, but requisite skills do not, at least gauged by 
the low number of nuclear-powered submarines and their capabilities. Some American naval 
strategists clearly believe that China has substantial problems with its SSBNs and SSNs. They 
note that it is of interests that China has not deployed other nuclear submarine platforms after the 
Shang-class and Jin-class. Especially the noise levels of the boats are significantly higher than 
American or Russian designs, and they state that “China’s naval strategists are not naive and do 
not believe its submarine fleet will close the gap in the near- or even mid-term.”159 There is a 
new SSN in the offing though, the Type-095. This will be China’s third-generation SSN based 
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on the Shang-class design. The U.S. Department of Defence predicts up to five of the class,
160
 
and as can be seen on the graph above regarding the relative quietness submarines, the Type-095 
is featured with and expected arrival of 2015. 
As a yardstick for how mature China’s nuclear-powered submarine is the numbers deployed. 
Some assessments of the possible numbers of PLAN SSBN and SSNs from a decade ago have 
proved to wildly inaccurate. A Russian estimate from 2003 proposed Chinese intensions of 
acquiring 10 SSBNs and 12 SSNs by the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century,
161
 and in 
1999, a Chinese naval strategist envisaged that China must field 12 SSBNs and no less than 30 
SSNs to augment 36 conventional submarines.
162
 Said strategist must be sorry now with a PLAN 
inventory of 4 SSBNs and 5 SSNs. Discounting the relic Xia-class and Han-class, China can 
only muster 5 nuclear-powered submarines in total. 
 
Concluding on Nuclear-powered Submarines 
 
China is not even remotely close to fielding a large nuclear-centred submarine fleet of the 
predicted posture of Hypothesis 4. Held up with the demonstrated impressive build up of 
advanced conventional-powered submarines discussed in H3, the trend is surely not going in the 
direction of a large fleet of SSNs. However, a small caveat is perhaps in its place. The fact that 
China is fielding any nuclear-powered submarines at all is surely much more than nothing. The 
commissioning of a sole Xia-class SSBN was a question of having or not having an SSBN, in 
spite of its noisy performance, radiation leakage and short range of its single warhead JL-1 
SLBM. The Jin-class is not wrongly viewed in the same light of having or not having a 
continuously deployed sea-based nuclear deterrent. It is another, though moderate, climb up the 
ladder towards great power status. Likewise with the Shang-class SSN, they do constitute a 
modest capability in the domain of nuclear-powered underwater combatants. At least, the 4 
Shangs mean that China is in the SSN game, and the coming of the Type-095 is further testament 
to be sure that China remain a nuclear-powered submarine player. 
 
Large Surface Combatants for Autonomous Deployment 
 
For China to gain entrance to the exclusive club of countries with a power projection capability 
beyond its own region, H4 predicted the continuous deployment of more long-range oceangoing 
surface combatants suitable for autonomous deployment such as the multifunctional destroyers 
and frigates with increasingly advanced layered area air defence, anti-surface warfare and 
weapons systems previously discussed. As discussed in H2, China clearly moved ahead in this 
field with breathtaking pace. Though not perhaps capable of a true blue-water surface fleet, the 
trend in this direction is so overwhelming that it gives credence to the predicted force posture i 
H4 as well. Perhaps the Luyang I-class destroyer and the Jiangkai I-class frigate will not be able 
to keep up in a Chinese bit for extra-regional strategic ambitions, but the Luyang II-class 
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probably is, and if the Luyang III-class will keep up the exponential modernization and upgrade 
of capabilities and be deployed in large numbers. Beijing is surely well on its way. 
However, the PLAN would also need the requisite support ships to keep its destroyers deployed 
and operational in distant waters, especially replenishment-at-sea oilers on will be needed. 
Hence, we shall look at the development in the logistic and support ships. 
Logistics and Support Ships 
 
The modern destroyers and frigates that the PLAN now fields enable Beijing in distant waters, 
exemplified by China’s participation in anti piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. The fact that 
China did contribute to maritime security operations off the Coast of Africa is testament to the 
increasing prowess of the PLAN. Yet, possessing the surface combat ships that do the actual 
patrolling and potential fighting is inadequate without the logistics and support vessels enabling 
long-term deployment in distant waters. As an army marches on its stomach, navy ships are in 
need of being restocked. The crucial element such auxiliary boats play in modern navies is even 
more pronounced  if access to overseas bases is not an option. China does not have any naval 
bases, or any other military bases for that matter, in other countries. It is, therefore, essential 
especially to have ships capable of carrying out replenishment at sea (RAS) in order to sustain 
operations farther away from the Chinese coastal waters. 
The Chinese navy has not had this capability until very recently. The PLAN has been deploying 
a large auxiliary fleet for a long time in a range of different classes, running the full spectrum of 
logistics support, repair, hydrographic survey and research types and a number of small oilers 
and tug boats.
163
 Here, the focus will be on replenishment oilers with RAS capability. 
Number of oilers, 1997-2013: 
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The diagram shows the total number of oilers in the Chinese navy. The vast majority of these 
transport oilers are old ships. Its replenishment consisted of coastal and relatively short-range oil 
tankers (AOT) or water tankers (AWT), such as the Guangzhou-class, built in the 1970s and 
1980s, of which six are in service today (two of which oilers, the remaining four are water 
tankers),
164
 the Fulin-class commissioned in 1972, reportedly some equipped with a single 
underway replenishment rig, of which more than 20 were constructed (14 AOT, 5 AWT) and the 
remaining going into commercial service,
165
 and the Fuzhou-class built between 1964-1972 with 
18 boats still in service today (11 AOT, 7 AWT).
166
 
 
Replenishment at Sea 
 
The first class of ships built for the Chinese Navy to conduct underway replenishment was the 
Fuqing-class. The ship became operational in 1979 and only two were commissioned into the 
PLAN. A third was converted to commercial use in 1989, and a fourth boat was sold to Pakistan 
in 1987. The two Fuqing-class RAS-capable oilers remain in service today.
167
 
China acquired the RAS-capable Nanyun-class (Komandarm Fedko-class) fleet replenishment 
craft (AOR) from Russia in 1992 for a reported $10 million. The boat was laid down for the 
Soviet navy in 1989 and delivered in an almost complete state in Dalian Ship Yard for fitting out 
in 1993.
168
 The single boat was commissioned by the PLAN in 1996 and remains in service
 
 
today. The boat has RAS rigs on both sides and refuelling at the stern, as well as a helicopter 
landing and small hangar, a range of 12.000 km, and a cargo capacity of at least 9.630 tons of 
fuel.
169
 
Until 2007, these three relatively old boats were the only ocean-going replenishment oilers in 
PLAN inventory, a major weakness in any of its blue-water aspirations. However, the PLAN has 
deployed the two first boats of a modern, indigenously designed RAS-capable supply ship, the 
Fuchi-class (Type 903). These boats was laid down in 2002, launched in 2003, and 
commissioned in 2004. An additional two boats were laid down in 2010 and launched in the 
spring of 2012, and is expected to be commissioned into the PLAN in 2013.
170
 The Fuchi-class 
apparently bearing a noticeable resemblance with the one Similan-class (Type R22T) tanker built 
for Thailand by China State Shipbuilding Corporation in 1994. The RAS-capable tanker 
compliments Thailand’s Chakri Naruebet aircraft carrier and the Naresuan-class frigates, giving 
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the Thai Navy full deployment capability.
171
 With the commissioning of China’s first aircraft 
carrier this is worthy of notice. China’s new and modern frigates and destroyers along with the 
Liaoning air craft carrier will be substantially more valuable and versatile with the four Fuchi-
class RAS-capable ships. 
 
 
 
The graph illustrates the described development in RAS-capable oilers, 1997-2013. The lack of 
overseas bases and few modern RAS-capable boats remain a shortcoming in China’s blue-water 
navy ambitions, but the launch and soon-to-come commissioning of the additional Fuchi-class 
ships more than doubles the number of AOR ships in this class in the PLAN’s inventory. This 
development bears testament both to the fact that Beijing is keenly aware of its weaknesses in 
this area, and that the PLAN is addressing the issue by launching new ships. Worth mentioning 
in this context is that the two Fuchi-class ships already in service have been part of the ongoing 
anti piracy missions off the coast of the Horn of Africa. Such missions allow the PLAN to get 
accustomed to the replenishment tasks essential to sustaining its destroyers and frigates in distant 
waters. 
 
China’s Mission to the Gulf of Aden 
 
China has been taking part in the international naval mission to combat piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden off the coast of East Arica and the Arabian Peninsula. Beijing has maintained a flotilla in 
the ongoing Gulf of Aden mission for more than four years now. Piracy has been a serious 
maritime security issue in these waters, threatens maritime shipping in general, and it has also 
plagued Chinese ships directly. In late 2008, the Chinese ship Zhenhua saw off an attack by 
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Somali pirates with water cannon and homemade Molotov-cocktails.
172
 In a bizarre incident 
widely reported in international media, a Chinese cargo ships was allegedly saved by a huge 
flock of thousands of dolphins that surfaced and blocked a group of Somali pirates as they were 
raising towards the Chinese vessel.
173
 The 25 crewmembers of the bulk carrier De Xin Hai were 
not so fortunate as to have cetaceans as guarding them and were held captive for 70 days before 
being released by their pirate captors. Reportedly, a $4 million ransom was paid to secure the 
release though a statement by the Chinese foreign ministry mentioned a ransom being paid.
174
 
Surely, guarding one’s ships against such attacks has a palpable impact on the security situation 
for merchant ships in the region. As mentioned, the majority of China’s trade is seaborne as is its 
oil imports, so it makes good sense for a stronger China to seek to protect its shipping. In 
addition, it is a signal of China’s entrance on the global stage as a “responsible stakeholder” 
shouldering some of the burden of protecting common goods such as safe passage on the seas. 
This echoes the addition to the Deng Xiaoping’s 24 character strategy that though a rising China 
should pay heed to the strategy’s central message of biding its time and modernize before 
sticking its head out, China should none the less start “making some contributions.” 
But the anti-piracy missions also have an arguably more valuable role to play for Beijing. It 
allows the PLAN to gain valuable experience with out-of-area operations. The training and 
experience gained is crucial if China want to operate with confidence in the “Far Seas.” Missions 
far away from home bases requires the autonomously deployable combat ships that China has 
built, but it also requires the replenishment-at-sea logistical skills carried out over long distances. 
Even more so since China does not have any overseas bases. 
 
Concluding on H4: Extra-Regional  Ambitions 
 
China has moved somewhat in the direction of building a fleet for out of area operations, but not 
nearly in the same extremely revisionist degree envisioned by H4. The predicted focus on a 
submarine fleet containing numerous SSBNs and an attack submarine fleet centred on SSNs has 
clearly not been the case. China does not possess a serious nuclear submarine programme, and 
the tendency has clear been to invest in conventional-powered submarines as demonstrated in the 
hypotheses. However, the PLAN has laboured hard at building up a fleet of modern destroyers 
and frigates suitable for autonomous deployment which has also been discussed in the previous 
hypotheses. H4 predicted the China would need to field a fleet of support vessels capable of 
conducting RAS-operations and maintaining a large fleet for out of area operations. The PLAN 
has showed a tendency in addressing this long-standing deficiency, but China has not deployed 
nearly enough RAS-capable support ship to back up the prediction in H4. In sum, China is not 
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behaving as a tremendous revisionist and H4 is not backed up by data sufficient to support the 
predicted posture.  
 
VIII: Conclusion 
 
This thesis asked one of the most basic questions in international politics, certainly so within the 
structural realist theoretical tradition. It asked whether China is a revisionist power. The answer 
is yes. 
The defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz sees all great powers as inherently status quo-oriented. 
The structural forces compel the strongest states in the system to have a keen eye on the balance 
of power and to retain their position or only incrementally increase it.  The search for security is 
the most important motivating factor explaining state behaviour, and the international system is a 
self-help system and great powers can look to no other to provide for their security. 
Nevertheless, security is quite plentiful because the status quo orientation of the great powers 
will restrict their appetite for power. Being too strong frightens the other great powers and will 
drive them to form a balancing coalition and eventually contain the revisionist or bring about its 
downfall. 
On the other hand, the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer sees the same structural forces to 
cause the great powers to be revisionist of nature. The quest for security obliges states to 
maximise their power. There is no knowing when enough power is enough and thus the hunger 
for power is insatiable. States pay a great deal of attention to the balance of power, but they are 
always looking for ways to change it in their favour, and the only way to be sure that others will 
not bring endanger ones safety is to be stronger than them. Hence, the strategic behaviour of 
great powers is innately revisionist. 
On the basis this fundamental divide this thesis generated four hypotheses to explain the strategic 
behaviour of China in the maritime domain by measuring the capabilities of the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy. The predicted posture in each hypothesis portray where the main thrust 
of naval capability development and modernization would be demonstrable. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a naval posture of on the basis of defensive realism of to secure the 
realm, the naval equivalent of digging trenches. H1 sat predicted three areas where the focus of 
China’s modernization process would be centred – a small force of nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarines for deterrence, small and short range conventional-powered attack 
submarines, and coastal surface combatants to patrol and defend the Chinese littoral. 
The empirical data examined found evidence for sea-based nuclear deterrence with an SSBN 
fleet of a size and composition as predicted. Few in number, not that impressive, but just enough 
to give China nuclear second strike capability 
However, regarding the coastal patrol craft expected to be the decisive surface force for a 
strategy of strictly coastal defence, the data showed the a tendency in the opposite direction. The 
fleet of patrol craft has indeed been upgraded with a new and vastly more capable ship, but the 
overall number of coastal defence ships declined decisively. 
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The third predicted key component of a very defensively oriented force posture was a submarine 
fleet centred small, short-range submarines optimised for littoral combat. Modernization of the 
Chinese submarine fleet has been overwhelmingly towards more, bigger long-range with 
offensive weaponry, moving reality further away from the predicted posture. Therefore, H1 must 
be rejected as having the least explanatory power 
Hypothesis 2 proposed a naval posture of a more assertive but nonetheless defensive 
composition. Motivated not by revisionism, but by the preponderance of American power and 
the growing naval strength of regional powers, China would engage in more vigorous balancing 
to retain its position.  
The predicted posture consisted of larger littoral defence ships capable operating and checking 
an opponent further away from Chinese shores. Such ships are not operationally deployed by the 
Chinese Navy, but the data suggested a new corvette to be out into service in large numbers in 
the near-term. However, potential numbers of future ships does not constitute reality, and the 
testing of the hypothesis relies on behaviour in the investigated period of time. Consequently that 
particular prediction is soundly rejected. 
Secondly, another aspect of the predicted force posture was surface vessels suitable for 
autonomous deployment. The investigated data showed a growth of modern and capable 
destroyers and frigates that has been nothing short of staggering. From a near-zero starting point, 
the increase in terms of tonnage displacement has taken place at such a breathtaking pace that it 
bears repeating. The surface fleet of the PLAN’s modern destroyers and frigates grew by 1730%. 
On the one hand, the data utterly meets the prediction. Actually, so much so that it far surpasses 
the expected size of the surface fleet, and it seems hard to explain this behaviour from a 
defensive realist stance. Such a stunning increase in capabilities in such a short time span must 
be labelled power-maximizing behaviour if the term is ever to have meaning. 
The third predicted posture concerned the composition of the fleet of conventional submarines in 
the Chinese Navy. Again, the evidence found more went above and beyond the predicted 
posture. One of the domestically produced SSKs was found to be a prudent choice as the 
replacement of older classes and thus met the prediction. But the advent of a substitute in tandem 
with the deployment of big foreign-bought and highly advanced SSKs in addition to an 
indigenously produced large SSK third being rapidly instated the navy in fairly large volumes. 
The point raised about the growth of surface combatants must be repeated here, as the increase in 
the Chinese submarine fleet cannot be explained as status quo-seeking behaviour. 
The last point raised was the introduction of an anti-ship ballistic missile. Maybe the Chinese 
ASBM has already been deployed, although it is not known for certain. H2 envisions the ASBM 
to be used as deterrence only, and the data examined showed that the missile’s range is probably 
too short range to deny U.S. carriers to operate within the first island chain. 
Hypoethesis 3 envisioned China to be revisionist of nature and attempting to build a navy with 
the aim of gaining regional dominance. 
The first element of the predicted posture regards the build up of amphibious forces for a limited 
power projection capability. The data shows that China is indeed moving in that direction with 
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three large ships for this purpose already commissioned and a fourth in build. Operating in 
regional waters, the amphibious force in the making supports the trend of a Chinese seeking to 
revise the balance of power in the region. 
Especially so in the light of the second prediction. The posture predicts an impressive submarine 
fleet of numerous and large conventional submarines. As has been clearly evident, China has 
build exactly that in the period of time investigated. The current submarine force corresponds 
well with the prediction in H3 to become a dominant naval power in the region. 
Thirdly, the introduction of an aircraft carrier has come to fruition. On its own, the single carrier 
is not the tool of great power projection, and it is not something that will push the Americans out 
of Northeast Asia. But, it will conceivably offer China great leverage in the maritime disputes 
with the other littoral countries in the South China Sea 
Seen as a combined force, building on the findings in H1 and H2, the Chinese Navy surely look 
determined to dominate its maritime domain. With the new missile-armed patrol boats and 
impressive submarine fleet operating under the cover of China’s air defence surface fleet and the 
advent of an aircraft carrier provide China which such a navy. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is found 
to have a high degree of explanatory power regarding China’s strategic behaviour in the 
maritime domain. 
Hypothesis 4 operated from the envisaged China to be an extremely revisionist power. Not 
satisfied as being the dominant force in the region, China was further expected to have extra-
regional ambitions and build a true blue-water navy. China would not yield and relentlessly 
maximise its power and develop capabilities to push into the Indian Ocean and the Western 
Pacific. 
The predicted posture of H4 entailed a fleet of SSBNs remarkably larger than the very modest 
nuclear-deterrence force expected in H1. This has by no means been the reality. The data does 
not support any tendency for China to invest heavily in a large number of SSBNs. Even more so, 
the evidence has showed China seek to base its fleet of attack submarines on nuclear-powered 
boats. Evidently, China has invested heavily in conventional-powered SSKs as pointed out 
above. 
The second element of the posture of H4 was larger on more surface combatants suitable for 
autonomous deployment. As pointed out on the conclusion of H2, this has certainly been the 
case. China is not in a position to maintain a fleet of modern destroyers and frigates, but it has 
evidently gone out of its way to build up one as fast as possible. As noted above, this has indeed 
at a breathtaking pace. 
In order to maintain a surface fleet in distant waters H4 predicted China to build of a fleet of 
support ships with long-range replenishment capabilities. China has showed determination to 
move ahead in this area, but from the data collected, China is still far from having the 
capabilities in this area as predicted. 
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The overall conclusion of this thesis, based on the empirical evidence investigated, is that 
Hypothesis 3 generated by offensive realism has the most explanatory power regarding China’s 
strategic behaviour in the maritime domain. 
So yes, China is a revisionist state. 
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H3 - In Pursuit of 
Regional 
Dominance 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations 
 
A2AD – Anti-Access/Area Denial 
AIP – Air Independent Propulsion 
ASCM – Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASBM – Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
AShM – Anti-Ship Missile 
ASW – Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ASuW – Anti-Surface Warfare 
CCP – Chinese Communist Party 
CDS – Combat Direction System 
CIWS – Close-In Weapon System 
DDG/H/M – Guided Missile Destroyer/ with Hangar/with Surface-to-Air Missile defence 
FAC – Fast Attack Craft 
FFG/H/M – Guided Missile Frigate/with Hangar/with Surface-to-Air Missile defence 
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
KMT - Kuomintang 
LACM – Land-Attack Cruise Missile 
LCAC – Landing Craft Air Cushion 
LPD – Landing Platform Dock 
MRBM –Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
PLA – People’s Liberation Army 
PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PLAAF - People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
PRC – People’s Republic of China 
RAS – Replenishment At Sea 
SAM – Surface-to-Air Missile 
SLBM – Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 
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SLOC – Sea Lines of Communication 
SRBM – Short Range Ballistic Missile 
SSM – Surface-to-Surface Missile 
SSK – Conventinal-powered attack submarine 
SSBN – Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile submarine 
SSN – Nuclear-powered attack submarine 
UCAC – Utility Craft Air Cushion 
VLS – Vertical Launch System 
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Appendix B: Tables 
Submarine of the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
 
Class Units
, 
2013 
Displacement Laid down/Launched/Commissioned 
Golf-class SS (SLBM 
test platform) 
1 2,388 NA/1966/NA 
Romeo-class, SSG (test 
platform) 
1 1,830 Built in 1962 
Qing-class SSB (SLBM 
test platform 
1 5,000 est. NA/2004/NA 
Ming-class SSK (4 Type 
035/ 12 Type 035G/ 4 
Type 035B) 
16 2,147 NA/1971-1979, 1996-2002/last of class 2002 
Song-class SSK (Type 
039/039G) 
16 2,286 1991-2003/1994-2004/1999-2006 
Yuan-class SSK (Type 
039A/B) 
12 2,900 (surfaced) NA/2004-2011/2006-2012 
Kilo-class SSK (Project 
636/636N/877) 
12 3,125 1996-2003/1997-2005/1998-2006 
Han-class SSN (Type 
091) 
3 5,639 1980-1987/1983-1990/1984-1990 
Shang-class SSN (Type 
093) 
2  (2 
in 
build) 
6,096 1994, 2000/2002,2003/2006, 2007 
Xia-class SSBN (Type 
092 
1 6,604 1978/1981/1987 
Jin-class SSBN (Type 
094 
3 (1 
in 
build) 
Unknown
175
 10,000 est. 
used for comparison 
2001-2004/2004-2009/2007-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
175
 IHS Jane’s does not list tonnage displacement for the Jin-class. Various other sources give differing estimates. 
www.sinodefence.com estimate 8-9,000 tonnes submerged, while www.globalsecurity.org assesses displacement 
to be 11,000 tonnes submerged. Both these websites are referenced in academic articles, see, for example: Lyle, 
GoldStein & Murray William, Undersea Dragons: China’s maturing Submarine Force, International Security vol. 28, 
no. 4, 2004, p. 166, note 20, and p. 170, note 37. 
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 SSBN Units Combined 
Tonnage 
SSN Units Combined 
Tonnage 
SSK176 Units Combined 
Tonnage 
Total 
Units 
Total 
Tonnage 
1997 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 3 Kilo 
13 Ming 
1 Song 
36 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
55 
 
109,969 61 144,768 
1998 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 3 Kilo 
16 Ming 
1 Song 
36 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
58 116,479 
 
64 151,278 
1999 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
17 Ming 
1 Song 
41 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
65 130,924 71 165,723 
 
2000 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 5 Kilo 
17 Ming 
1 Song 
34 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
59 
 
 
121,239 65 156,038 
2001 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
63 129,856 69 163,655 
2002 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
63 
 
129,856 69 163,655 
2003 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
63 129,856 69 163,655 
2004 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
63 129,856 69 163,655 
                                                          
176
 Submarines in parentheses are test platforms, mainly for SLBM trials. The Qing-class however, is believed also 
to be a test bed for air-independent technology as well as the JL-2 and/or projected JL-3 SLBM. In addition, it is 
speculated that the single Qing may be used to test the DF-21D ASBM, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships, Submarines – 
Auxiliary Submarines, 12 February 2013. 
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Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
2005 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
63 129,856 69 163,655 
2006 1 Xia 1 6,604 4 Han 4 22,556 3 Kilo 
19 Ming 
9 Song 
20 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
53 112,197 58 141,357 
 
2007 1 Xia 1 6,604 4 Han 4 22,556 10 Kilo 
20 Ming 
9 Song 
15 
Romeo 
2 Yuan 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
58 
 
132,692 
 
63 161,852 
2008 1 Xia 
2 Jin 
3 26,604 4 Han 
2 
Shang 
6 34,694 12 Kilo 
19 Ming 
10 Song 
2 Yuan 
8 Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
53 
 
126,248 62 187,546 
 
2009 1 Xia 
2 Jin 
3 26,604 4 Han 
2 
Shang 
6 34,694 12 Kilo 
19 Ming 
13 Song 
2 Yuan 
8 Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo)) 
56 
 
133,106 
 
65 194,404 
 
2010 1 Xia 
2 Jin 
3 26,604 4 Han 
2 
Shang 
6 34,694 12 Kilo 
19 Ming 
13 Song 
2 Yuan 
8 Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
56 133,106 
 
65 194,404 
2011 1 Xia 
2 Jin 
3 26,604 4 Han 
2 
Shang 
6 34,694 12 Kilo 
20 Ming 
16 Song 
4 Yuan 
8 Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
62 
 
147,934 71 209,232 
2012
177 
1 Xia 
3 Jin, 
(1 
4 36604 3 Han 
2 
Shang 
5 29109 12 Kilo 
20 Ming 
16 Song 
62 156494 71 222207 
                                                          
177
 Curiously, IISS Military Balance 2012 counts 68 tactical submarines, but only lists 59. Presumably, the 9 
“missing” boats are the decommissioned Romeo-class SSKs 
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boat 
in 
build 
12 Yuan 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
2013 1 Xia 
3 Jin, 
(1 
boat 
in 
build 
4 36604 3 Han 
2 
Shang 
5 29109 12 Kilo 
16 Ming 
16 Song 
12 Yuan 
(1 Qing) 
57 
 
148688 66 214401 
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Submarine of the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
 
Class Units
, 
2013 
Displacement Laid down/Launched/Commissioned 
Golf-class SS (SLBM 
test platform) 
1 2,388 NA/1966/NA 
Romeo-class, SSG (test 
platform) 
1 1,830 Built in 1962 
Qing-class SSB (SLBM 
test platform 
1 5,000 est. NA/2004/NA 
Ming-class SSK (4 Type 
035/ 12 Type 035G/ 4 
Type 035B) 
16 2,147 NA/1971-1979, 1996-2002/last of class 2002 
Song-class SSK (Type 
039/039G) 
16 2,286 1991-2003/1994-2004/1999-2006 
Yuan-class SSK (Type 
039A/B) 
12 2,900 (surfaced) NA/2004-2011/2006-2012 
Kilo-class SSK (Project 
636/636N/877) 
12 3,125 1996-2003/1997-2005/1998-2006 
Han-class SSN (Type 
091) 
3 5,639 1980-1987/1983-1990/1984-1990 
Shang-class SSN (Type 
093) 
2  (2 
in 
build) 
6,096 1994, 2000/2002,2003/2006, 2007 
Xia-class SSBN (Type 
092 
1 6,604 1978/1981/1987 
Jin-class SSBN (Type 
094 
3 (1 
in 
build) 
Unknown
178
 10,000 est. 
used for comparison 
2001-2004/2004-2009/2007-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
178
 IHS Jane’s does not list tonnage displacement for the Jin-class. Various other sources give differing estimates. 
www.sinodefence.com estimate 8-9,000 tonnes submerged, while www.globalsecurity.org assesses displacement 
to be 11,000 tonnes submerged. Both these websites are referenced in academic articles, see, for example: Lyle, 
GoldStein & Murray William, Undersea Dragons: China’s maturing Submarine Force, International Security vol. 28, 
no. 4, 2004, p. 166, note 20, and p. 170, note 37. 
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 SSBN Units Combined 
Tonnage 
SSN Units Combined 
Tonnage 
SSK179 Units Combined 
Tonnage 
Total 
Units 
Total 
Tonnage 
1997 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 3 Kilo 
13 Ming 
1 Song 
36 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
55 
 
109,969 61 144,768 
1998 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 3 Kilo 
16 Ming 
1 Song 
36 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
58 116,479 
 
64 151,278 
1999 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
17 Ming 
1 Song 
41 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
65 130,924 71 165,723 
 
2000 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 5 Kilo 
17 Ming 
1 Song 
34 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
59 
 
 
121,239 65 156,038 
2001 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
63 129,856 69 163,655 
2002 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
63 
 
129,856 69 163,655 
2003 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
63 129,856 69 163,655 
2004 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
63 129,856 69 163,655 
                                                          
179
 Submarines in parentheses are test platforms, mainly for SLBM trials. The Qing-class however, is believed also 
to be a test bed for air-independent technology as well as the JL-2 and/or projected JL-3 SLBM. In addition, it is 
speculated that the single Qing may be used to test the DF-21D ASBM, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships, Submarines – 
Auxiliary Submarines, 12 February 2013. 
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Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
2005 1 Xia 1 6,604 5 Han 5 28,195 4 Kilo 
19 Ming 
3 Song 
35 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
63 129,856 69 163,655 
2006 1 Xia 1 6,604 4 Han 4 22,556 3 Kilo 
19 Ming 
9 Song 
20 
Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
53 112,197 58 141,357 
 
2007 1 Xia 1 6,604 4 Han 4 22,556 10 Kilo 
20 Ming 
9 Song 
15 
Romeo 
2 Yuan 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
58 
 
132,692 
 
63 161,852 
2008 1 Xia 
2 Jin 
3 26,604 4 Han 
2 
Shang 
6 34,694 12 Kilo 
19 Ming 
10 Song 
2 Yuan 
8 Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
53 
 
126,248 62 187,546 
 
2009 1 Xia 
2 Jin 
3 26,604 4 Han 
2 
Shang 
6 34,694 12 Kilo 
19 Ming 
13 Song 
2 Yuan 
8 Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo)) 
56 
 
133,106 
 
65 194,404 
 
2010 1 Xia 
2 Jin 
3 26,604 4 Han 
2 
Shang 
6 34,694 12 Kilo 
19 Ming 
13 Song 
2 Yuan 
8 Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
56 133,106 
 
65 194,404 
2011 1 Xia 
2 Jin 
3 26,604 4 Han 
2 
Shang 
6 34,694 12 Kilo 
20 Ming 
16 Song 
4 Yuan 
8 Romeo 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
62 
 
147,934 71 209,232 
2012
180 
1 Xia 
3 Jin, 
(1 
4 36604 3 Han 
2 
Shang 
5 29109 12 Kilo 
20 Ming 
16 Song 
62 156494 71 222207 
                                                          
180
 Curiously, IISS Military Balance 2012 counts 68 tactical submarines, but only lists 59. Presumably, the 9 
“missing” boats are the decommissioned Romeo-class SSKs 
80 
 
 
 
 
boat 
in 
build 
12 Yuan 
(1 Golf, 
1 
Romeo) 
2013 1 Xia 
3 Jin, 
(1 
boat 
in 
build 
4 36604 3 Han 
2 
Shang 
5 29109 12 Kilo 
16 Ming 
16 Song 
12 Yuan 
(1 Qing) 
57 
 
148688 66 214401 
 
 
 
